按照DSU第22条第7款规定，仲裁员并不涉及审查中止减让和其他义务的性质，其主要是确定：此类中止的水平是否等于利益抵消或减损的水平；拟议的中止减让或其他义务是否为适用协定所允许；中止减让或其他义务是否遵循了报复的程序和规则。仲裁人作出的仲裁裁决具有终局性，有关各方不得寻求第二次仲裁。仲裁裁决应当迅速通知DSB，以便其作出中止减让或其他义务的授权，此处的决策机制依然是“反向一致”。
3.报复实施的监督及报复的终止
根据DSU第22条第8款规定，在补偿或报复期间，DSB应当继续监督裁决的实施情况。在此期间，裁决的实施问题仍然一直保留在DSB会议的议程上，并且有关成员应就实施裁决的进展情况向DSB作出书面汇报，直到有关措施最后符合有关协定的规定，或者双方达成解决争议的办法为止。
报复只是一种临时安排，一旦出现下述情况则报复应当终止：第一，违反有关协定的措施已经被取消；第二，被诉方已经对受影响的利益提供了解决办法；第三，争端双方已经达成满意的解决办法。
七、对WTO争端解决机制的评价
（一）统一了争端解决的机构及程序
原GATT的争端解决机构主要是缔约方全体，解决争端的程序主要依据GATT第22、23条。但是在东京回合之后，随着《反倾销守则》、《补贴与反补贴守则》、《技术贸易壁垒守则》等的签订，针对这些协定项下的争端又设立了新的争端解决机构和程序。这就使得GATT争端解决机构和程序出现了混乱。WTO则建立了专门的争端解决机构DSB，虽然还是放在总理事会中，但却有自己独立的人员和职责。另外，WTO的DSU所确立的争端解决程序基本上适用于所有的多边协定，[22]统一了WTO争端解决的程序。WTO建立了专门的争端解决机构和统一适用的争端解决程序，避免了原来解决争端机构和程序的不确定性，加强了其争端解决的专业化和法制化程度。
（二）确立了“反向一致”的决策机制
采取“反向一致”的决策方式是WTO争端解决机制的一大创新。此前，无论是GATT还是其他的国际组织往往都是采用“肯定式”的决策机制，要么是肯定式的协商一致，要么是肯定式的多数投票制。WTO的“反向一致”决策方式是指否定式协商一致，只要不是全体成员一致反对，则决策就被通过。具体来看，专家组的成立、专家组或上诉机构报告的通过以及报复等重大事项的决策均采用“反向一致”的决策机制。这种决策机制不仅使DSB获得了强制的管辖权，而且使专家组或上诉机构报告的通过具有了“自动性”，有利于DSB裁决得以顺利的执行。
（三）规定了争端解决的时限
与GATT相比，WTO中的DSU对每一个争端解决的环节都设定了严格的时间限制。见下表：
说明：表中争端解决程序每一阶段的大约时间为目标数字，协议对此的规定是灵活的。此外，各国可在任何阶段自行解决争端。时间总计也是估算数字。[23]
WTO这种严格的审限规定，有利于及时纠正成员违反WTO协定的行为，使受害方得到及时的救济，这有助于增强成员对该机制的信心。
（四）增设了上诉审程序
GATT的争端解决程序采用了传统的一审终局的模式，如果出现错误或疏漏，很难及时得以纠正。WTO争端解决机制则增加了上诉程序，虽然上诉机构只能审查专家组报告所涉及的法律问题，但是通过上诉程序不仅可以修改专家组报告的法律适用错误，更重要的是增强了程序上的威慑力。上诉审程序的设立，使得WTO争端解决机制更加完善、更具司法特征。
（五）引入了报复机制
国际法与国内法相比，其重要的一个缺陷在于缺乏强制的执行手段，GATT并没有很好地解决此问题。WTO建立后，在其争端解决执行的问题上建立了对裁决执行的监督制度，其中一个重要的手段即授权胜诉方对败诉方中止减让或其他义务，即报复。这种报复，既可以在相同协定相同部门或相同协定不同部门进行，也可以在不同协定进行，具有很强的威慑力。
综上所述，WTO争端解决机制，大大提高了争端解决的效率，为多边体制的正常运行提供了强力的保障。但任何事物都不是完美无缺的，WTO争端解决机制也是如此，比如实践中解决争端的时间超过规定的时限、对发展中国家的优惠难以落到实处、争端解决程序本身也存在着这样那样的问题[24]。因此，我们在对WTO争端解决机制进行肯定的同时也不能忽视其已有的缺陷。
Case Study
UNITED STATES - SECTION 129（c）（1） OF THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT[25]
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On 17 January 2001 Canada requested consultations with the United States pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes （hereafter the “DSU”）, Article ⅩⅫ of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 （hereafter the “GATT 1994”）, Article 30 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures （hereafter the “SCM Agreement”） and Article 17 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article Ⅵ of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 （hereafter the “AD Agreement”） regarding section 129（c）（1） of the US Uruguay Round Agreements Act （hereafter the “URAA”）[26] and the Statement of Administrative Action （hereafter the “SAA”）[27] accompanying the URAA.[28]
…
The Principle of Prospective Remedies in the Dispute Settlement Process
Canada fails to address the obligations imposed by the DSU, having abandoned all DSU claims raised in its panel request. Canada's decision to abandon these claims is not surprising, given that an examination of these provisions reinforces the prospective nature of WTO remedies. The fact that Canada has made no claim under the DSU should be sufficient for the Panel to find that they have failed to make a prima facie case.
Textual Analysis of the DSU
Language used throughout the DSU demonstrates that when a Member's measure has been found to be inconsistent with a WTO Agreement, the Member's obligation extends only to providing prospective relief, and not to remedying past transgressions. For example, under Article 19.1 of the DSU, when it has found a measure to be inconsistent with a Member's WTO obligations a panel or the Appellate Body “shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that Agreement”. The ordinary meaning of the term “bring” is to “produce as a consequence”, or “cause to become”[29]. These definitions give a clear indication of future action, supporting the conclusion that the obligation of a Member whose measure has been found inconsistent with a WTO agreement is to ensure that the measure is removed or altered in a prospective manner, not to provide retroactive relief.
Article 3.7 of the DSU also supports the conclusion that the obligation to implement DSB recommendations is prospective in nature. Article 3.7 states, “In the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements.” The focus of WTO dispute settlement is on withdrawal of the measure, and not on providing compensation for the measure's past existence.
In a WTO case challenging an antidumping or countervailing duty measure, the measure in question is a border measure. Accordingly, revoking a WTO inconsistent antidumping or countervailing duty measure prospectively will constitute “withdrawal” of the measure within the meaning of Article 3.7 of the DSU.
Article 21.3 of the DSU provides further support for this conclusion. Under Article 21.3, when immediate compliance is impracticable, Members shall have a reasonable period of time in which to bring their measure into conformity with their WTO obligations. Nothing in Article 21.3 suggests that Members are obliged, during the course of the reasonable period of time, to suspend application of the offending measure, much less to provide relief for past effects. Rather, in the case of antidumping and countervailing duty measures, entries that take place during the reasonable period of time may continue to be liable for the payment of duties.
Articles 22.1 and 22.2 of the DSU confirm not only that a Member may maintain the WTO inconsistent measure until the end of the reasonable period of time for implementation, but also that neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations are available to the complaining Member until the conclusion of that reasonable period of time. Thus, the DSU imposes no obligation on Members to cease application of the WTO inconsistent measure on entries occurring prior to the end of the reasonable period of time.
Panel and Appellate Body Clarification of the DSU
WTO panel reports addressing the implementation obligations of Members following an adverse WTO report confirm that such decisions be implemented in a prospective manner. In European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas - Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador[30], the panel discussed the prospective nature of the recommendations a panel or the Appellate Body can make under the DSU, stating, “we do not imply that the EC is under an obligation to remedy past discrimination”.
Rather, the principle of Article 3.7 of the DSU “requires compliance ex nunc as of the expiry of the reasonable period of time for compliance with the recommendations and rulings adopted by the DSB”.
In identifying three possible methods by which the European Communities could bring the measure into conformity, none of them involved providing a remedy for past transgressions.[31]
When panels and the Appellate Body have been asked to make recommendations for retroactive relief, they have rejected those requests, recognizing that a Member's obligation under the DSU is to provide prospective relief in the form of withdrawing a measure inconsistent with a WTO agreement, or bringing that measure into conformity with the agreement by the end of the reasonable period of time. In the six years of dispute settlement under the WTO agreements, no panel or the Appellate Body has ever suggested that bringing a WTO-inconsistent antidumping or countervailing duty measure into conformity with a Member's WTO obligations requires the refund of antidumping or countervailing duties collected on merchandise that entered prior to the date of implementation.
Canada's views on prospective application have been consistent with this view that the DSU only provides for prospective relief. Consistent with the concerns raised by many other Members, Canada has asserted that if Members’ obligations under the DSU were to be retroactive, the language would have been explicit because “it was a significant departure from previous practice …”[32]
This case is about the dispute settlement system. The fact that Canada has made no claim under the DSU is very telling; it highlights Canada's desire to avoid the well-accepted principle that the DSU does not require retroactive remedies. Section 129（c）（1） ensures that adverse WTO decisions will be implemented, in a prospective manner, in accordance with the requirements of the DSU.
…
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this report, the Panel concludes that Canada has failed to establish that section 129（c）（1） of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act is inconsistent with:
Article Ⅵ:2, Ⅵ:3 and Ⅵ:6（a） of the GATT 1994;
Articles 1, 9.3, 11.1 and 18.1 and 18.4 of the AD Agreement;
Articles 10, 19.4, 21.1, 32.1 and 32.5 of the SCM Agreement; and
Article ⅩⅥ:4 of the WTO Agreement.
In the light of its conclusion, the Panel makes no recommendations under Article 19.1 of the DSU.
Questions:
1. when a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, what should they do?
2. Talking about the surveillance of implementation of recommendations and rulings.
【复习思考题】
1.试论述GATT与WTO争端解决机制的联系和区别。
2.如何理解GATT第23条中的“利益丧失或损害”？
3.专家组和上诉机构报告是否应该具有先例效力？
4.试谈谈自己对WTO争端解决机制所存在的缺陷的看法。
[1] 杨国华：《WTO争端解决程序详解》，北京，中国方正出版社，2004，第28～29页。
[2] 此处的散发是指，DSB以WTO文件的形式发放。DSB往往是在收到磋商请求的通知后的一段时间才正式发放。
[3] If the complaining party so requests, a meeting of the DSB shall be convened for this purpose within 15 days of the request, provided that at least 10 days’ advance notice of the meeting is given.
[4] 在经过纺织品监督机构的程序之后，提出申诉的成员不必再经过磋商程序就可以直接请求成立专家组。
[5] 根据DSU第4条第3款和第5条第3款规定，可不经过实质的磋商而直接请求设立专家组。
[6] 王贵国：《世界贸易组织法》，北京，法律出版社，2003，第278页。
[7] 杨国华：《WTO争端解决程序详解》，北京，中国方正出版社，2004，第44页。
[8] 沈四宝主编：《世界贸易组织法教程》，北京，对外经济贸易大学出版社，2005，第383页。
[9] 但在实践中，专家组程序超过9个月的案例比比皆是。
[10] If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled within this period at a time that enables the requirements of paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article 16 to be met, a meeting of the DSB shall be held for this purpose.
[11] 1995年12月宣誓就职的首批上诉机构成员分别来自美国、新西兰、德国、埃及、菲律宾、乌拉圭和日本，其中法官、律师、经济学教授各1名，外交官及法学教授各2名。
[12] 杨国华：《WTO争端解决程序详解》，北京，中国方正出版社，2004，第131页。
[13] 本条规定的仲裁与DSU第21条第3款（c）项关于裁决合理期限的仲裁，以及第22条第6款关于裁决报复水平的仲裁不同，它们都是强制性的，只要一方提起，另一方就必须参加。
[14] If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting of the DSB shall be held for this purpose.
[15] If the parties cannot agree on an arbitrator within ten days after referring the matter to arbitration, the arbitrator shall be appointed by the Director-General within ten days, after consulting the parties.
[16] The expression “arbitrator” shall be interpreted as referring either to an individual or a group.
[17] 杨国华：《WTO争端解决程序详解》，北京，中国方正出版社，2004，第111页。
[18] 杨国华：《WTO争端解决程序详解》，北京，中国方正出版社，2004，第119～120页。
[19] 比如，GATS协定项下有11个部门，若败诉方的侵害措施发生在金融服务部门，则在此种情形下，胜诉方可以选择在金融服务部门之外的其他部门中止减让或其他义务。
[20] 举例来说，此种情形下，若败诉方的侵害发生在GATS协定项下，则胜诉方可以选择中止在TRIPS协定或货物贸易协定项下的减让或其他义务。
[21] The expression “arbitrator” shall be interpreted as referring either to an individual or a group.
[22] 有些协定条款中有特殊规定，详见前文第二节内容。
[23] WTO秘书处编：《乌拉圭回合协议导读》，索必成、胡盈之译，北京，法律出版社，2000，第44页。
[24] 比如专家组中期评审程序并未起到减少上诉的作用、上诉审超出法律范围等。
[25] WT/DS221/R, 15 July 2002.
[26] Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, section 129（c）（1）, 108 Stat. 4838, also codified at 19 U.S.C. 3538 （1994）.
[27] Statement of Administrative Action, in “Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Uruguay Round Agreement, Texts of Agreements Implementing Bill, Statement of Administrative Action and Required Supporting Statements”, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, Vol. 1, pp. 656 et seq.
[28] WT/DS221/1.
[29] The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993.
[30] Panel Report, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas - Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador （“EC - Bananas Ⅲ （Article 21.5 - Ecuador）”）, WT/DS27/RW/ECU, adopted 6 May 1999, para. 6.105.
[31] Ibid., paras. 6.155-6.158.
[32] Minutes of DSB Meeting of 11 February 2000, WT/DSB/M/75, p.8.