（2）合理与透明度的要求。对于合理与透明度的要求规定在协议第1条第4款中。该款规定，各成员方应及时公布与提交申请的程序有关的规则和所有信息，包括个人、公司和机构提出申请的资格、受理的一个或多个管理机构以及受限制的产品清单，以使其他成员方政府和贸易商知晓。只要可行，此类公布应在该要求生效日期前21天作出，但无论如何不得迟于该生效日期。同时，该款还规定，应给予希望提出书面意见的成员讨论这些意见的机会，有关成员应对这些意见和讨论结果给予应有的考虑。

（3）简化程序的要求。协议中还规定了对于程序的简化要求。一是申请表格应尽可能简单；二是申请程序和在适用情况下的展期申请程序应尽可能简单，应允许申请者有一段合理的期限提交许可证申请，如有截止日期，则该期限应至少为21天，并应规定如在此期限内未收到足够的申请，该期限可以延长；三是申请者应只需接洽与申请有关的一个行政机构，如确实不可避免需接洽一个以上的行政机构，则申请者应无需接洽三个以上的行政机构。

（4）申请宽容的要求。该要求体现在第1条第7、8两款上。第7款规定：No application shall be refused for minor documentation errors which do not alter basic data contained therein. No penalty greater than necessary to serve merely as a warning shall be imposed in respect of any omission or mistake in documentation or procedures which is obviously made without fraudulent intent or gross negligence；第8款规定：Licensed imports shall not be refused for minor variations in value, quantity or weight from the amount designated on the licence due to differences occurring during shipment, differences incidental to bulk loading and other minor differences consistent with normal commercial practice。

（5）用汇平等的要求。协议规定：The foreign exchange necessary to pay for licensed imports shall be made available to licence holders on the same basis as to importers of goods not requiring import licences。

2.自动进口许可

自动进口许可（Automatic Import Licensing）设立的目的不是为了限制有关产品的进口，主要是为了成员方统计国际贸易数据的方便。所以，与非自动许可证不同，其不能构成国际贸易壁垒。在自动进口许可的适用问题上，《进口许可证程序协议》在第2条第2款（a）中作了具体规定，内容如下：

Automatic licensing procedures shall not be administered in such a manner as to have restricting effects on imports subject to automatic licensing. Automatic licensing procedures shall be deemed to have trade-restricting effects unless, inter alia: （i） any person, firm or institution which fulfils the legal requirements of the importing Member for engaging in import operations involving products subject to automatic licensing is equally eligible to apply for and to obtain import licences; （ii） applications for licences may be submitted on any working day prior to the customs clearance of the goods; （iii） applications for licences when submitted in appropriate and complete form are approved immediately on receipt, to the extent administratively feasible, but within a maximum of 10 working days.

3.非自动进口许可

非自动进口许可通常是构成成员方的一种实施数量限制的行政管理方式。在审批该类许可证时，成员方可以拥有签发或拒绝的处置权。为了避免成员方擅用权力而对进口造成额外的限制和扭曲，尽可能地降低实施非自动许可证所引发的负面作用，保障国际贸易的正常发展，《进口许可证程序协议》第3条针对非自动许可证的适用作了较为详细的规定。

比如，在透明度方面，协议要求除了该类许可证本身的限制外，成员方不应在发证程序上再对进口实行其他限制；各成员应提供关于限制的管理情况、近期发放的进口许可证情况、许可证在供应国之间的分配情况等有关信息；成员方还应在规定期限内以使政府和贸易商知晓的方式，公布按数量和/或价值实施的配额总量、配额的发放和截止日期以及有关的任何变更。

此外，协议就公平实施许可问题规定，任何满足进口成员的法律和管理要求的个人、公司或机构均有同等资格申请许可证并予以考虑。同时还规定，分配许可证时，各成员应考虑申请人的进口实绩，并考虑对达到经济数量的产品发放许可证。在这方面，应特别考虑从发展中国家成员、特别是最不发达国家成员进口产品的进口商。

六、技术性贸易措施

（一）概述

20世纪六七十年代以来，各国出于保护本国环境等目的，以技术法规、标准及评定程序为手段，对外国商品设置了种种强制性的进口限制措施。各国在工业化程度、科学技术水平上存在差异，自然条件等各不相同，因此所出台的法规、标准也不尽相同。这些技术法规、标准和评定程序有助于进口国维护本国环境、保护公民健康和动植物安全，但是同时，由于其具有一定的隐蔽性和灵活性，所以容易对正常的国际贸易造成阻碍，进而演变成为贸易保护的工具。目前，技术性贸易限制措施已经上升为国际贸易中占主导性的非关税壁垒。据WTO统计，近几年来，各成员的通报中（即各成员制定的影响国际贸易的新规则）涉及技术规则的约占通报总量的70%以上。

鉴于各国政府及机构制定的技术法规、标准及评定程序对国际贸易的影响越来越广，为规范各缔约方在技术壁垒方面的管理行为，在1973年至1979年GATT第七个回合，即东京回合谈判中，成员方共同制定了《关税和贸易总协议贸易技术壁垒协议》（Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade，GATT/TBT），该协定于1980年发布实施。后来，在乌拉圭回合谈判中，各方又对GATT/TBT文本进行了讨论、修改，并于1994年4月定稿，列入部长会议最终决议文件，于乌拉圭回合谈判结束时与其他决议一同发布，成为世界贸易组织的一个重要协定，并改名为《技术性贸易壁垒协定》（Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade，TBT协定）。目前，TBT协定是专门协调技术法规、标准和评定程序的国际性准则。

TBT协定分为正文和附件两大部分，共有15条、3个附件。正文中包括序言、总则、技术法规和标准、情报和援助、争端解决等内容。附件1规定了8个术语及定义,其中对技术法规、标准和合格评定程序的概念作了特别规定；附件2是关于技术专家小组的规定；附件3是关于制定批准和实施标准的良好行为规范。

（二）TBT协定的目标

TBT协定在序言部分阐述了协定的目标：鼓励制定此类国际标准和合格评定体系；期望保证技术法规和标准，包括对包装、标志和标签的要求，以及对技术法规和标准的合格评定程序不给国际贸易制造不必要的障碍；不应阻止任何国家在其认为适当的程度内采取必要措施，保证其出口产品的质量，或保护人类、动物或植物的生命、健康及保护环境，或防止欺诈行为，但是这些措施的实施方式不得成为在情形相同的国家之间进行任意或不合理歧视的手段，或构成对国际贸易的变相限制，并应在其他方面与本协定的规定相一致；不应阻止任何国家采取必要措施以保护其基本安全利益，等等。

（三）主要内容

1.对技术法规和标准的定义

技术法规、标准和合格评定程序是TBT协定中最重要的内容，附件1对3个术语作了明确的定义。根据规定，技术法规是规定强制执行的产品特性或其相关工艺和生产方法、包括适用的管理规定在内的文件。该文件还可包括或单独适用于产品、工艺或生产方法的专门术语、符号、包装、标志或标签要求。标准是经公认机构批准的、规定非强制执行的、供通用或重复使用的产品或相关工艺和生产方法的规则、指南或特性的文件。该文件还可包括或单独适用于产品、工艺或生产方法的专门术语、符号、包装、标志或标签要求。合格评定程序指的是任何直接或间接用以确定是否满足技术法规或标准中的相关要求的程序。合格评定程序特别包括：抽样、检验和检查：评估、验证和合格保证；注册、认可和批准以及各项的组合。

2.技术法规和标准的制定、采用和实施

TBT协议第2条用了长达12款的篇幅就各成员方应如何制定、采用和实施技术法规作了详细的规定，第3条则规定了地方政府机构和非政府机构制定、采用和实施技术法规时应遵循的基本规则，第4条是对标准的制定、采用和实施作出的规定。下面对这几条中的部分内容作一下介绍。

（1）第2条是关于如何制定、采用和实施技术法规的规定，该条要求：

1）Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products imported from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like products originating in any other country;

2）Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create;

3）With a view to harmonizing technical regulations on as wide a basis as possible, Members shall play a full part, within the limits of their resources, in the preparation by appropriate international standardizing bodies of international standards for products for which they either have adopted, or expect to adopt, technical regulations;

4）Members shall ensure that all technical regulations which have been adopted are published promptly or otherwise made available in such a manner as to enable interested parties in other Members to become acquainted with them.

（2）第3条是对地方政府机构和非政府机构制定、采用和实施技术法规时应遵循的基本规则的规定。根据该条规定，成员方各自领土内的地方政府机构和非政府机构制定、采用和实施技术法规时，除了在某些情况下的通知义务之外，其他方面成员方一般应比照第2条所列适用于中央政府的规则和程序来履行义务。比如该条第4款规定，各成员不得采取要求或鼓励其领土内的地方政府机构或非政府机构以与第2条规定不一致的方式行事的措施。

（3）第4条规定的是标准的制定、采用和实施问题。根据该条，各成员应保证其中央政府标准化机构接受并遵守协定附件3中的《关于制定、采用和实施标准的良好行为规范》，并且应采取合理措施，保证其领土内的地方政府和非政府标准化机构，以及它们参加的或其领土内一个或多个机构参加的区域标准化组织同样接受并遵守该规范。同时该条还要求，成员不得采取直接或间接要求或鼓励此类标准化机构以与前述规范不一致的方式行事的措施。

3.合格评定程序

合格评定程序指任何用于直接或间接确定产品是否满足相关技术法规或标准之要求的程序。东京回合的TBT协议中提出了“认证”的概念，乌拉圭回合达成的TBT协定则将“认证”改为“合格评定程序”，许多在东京回合TBT协议的“认证”中没有涉及的行为，都被放入“合格评定程序”中加以规范和约束，例如检验、认可和批准等，这些变化在规范和消除各国在进口环节上的技术贸易壁垒方面起到了积极的促进作用。

根据TBT协定附件1所作的解释性说明，Conformity assessment procedures include, inter alia, procedures for sampling, testing and inspection; evaluation, verification and assurance of conformity; registration, accreditation and approval as well as their combinations。具体说来，此处的抽样（Sampling）指的是取出部分物质、材料或产品作为整体的代表性样品进行测试或校准的规定过程。取样要求也可由物质、材料或产品的测试或校准的有关规范提出。在某种情况下（如法医鉴定），样品可能不是代表性的，而是由实际可得性决定的；检测（Testing）是按规定程序对给定产品、过程或服务的一种或多种特性加以确定的技术运作；检验（Inspection）是指通过观察和判断（适宜时辅之以测量、测试或度量）进行符合性评价；符合性评价（Evaluation of conformity）则是系统地检查某个产品、过程或服务满足规定要求的程度；验证（Verification） 是通过检查和提供证据来证实规定的要求已得到满足的过程；符合性保证（Assurance of conformity） 是对产品、过程或服务满足规定要求的程度给予确认的活动；注册（Registration） 指由某个团体用于以某种适宜的、公众可得到的一览表指出产品、过程或服务的特性，或给出团体或人的详细资料的程序；认可（Accreditation） 则是由权威团体对团体或个人执行特定任务的胜任能力给予正式承认的程序；批准（Approval） 指允许产品、过程或服务按说明的目的或按说明的条件销售或使用；认证（Certification）是第三方用于对产品、过程或服务符合规定要求给出书面保证的程序。

根据TBT协定第5条的规定，各成员在需要切实保证符合技术法规或标准时，其中央政府机构对源自其他成员领土内的产品的要求应满足如下条件：（1）合格评定程序的制定、采用和实施，应在可比的情况下以不低于给予本国同类产品的供应商或源自任何其他国家同类产品的供应商的条件，使源自其他成员领土内产品的供应商获得准入；（2）公布每一合格评定程序的标准处理时限，或应请求，告知申请人预期的处理时限；（3）建立一程序，以审查有关实施合格评定程序的投诉，且当一投诉被证明属合理时采取纠正措施；（4）保证迅速公布已采用的所有合格评定程序，或以可使其他成员中的利害关系方知晓的其他方式提供。

4.信息通报与技术援助

技术法规和标准涉及各种各样的产品，随着技术的不断进步，技术法规和标准不断变动。为了保证不因变动对正常的国际贸易造成障碍，TBT协议第10条规定了对技术信息进行通报的要求，以保证技术法规和标准的透明度。该条规定：每一成员应保证设立咨询点，能够回答其他成员和其他成员中的利害关系方提出的所有合理询问；各成员应采取所能采取的合理措施，保证其他成员或其他成员中的利害关系方能够依照本协定的规定索取文件副本；鼓励有关成员应请求与其他成员进行磋商，以达成类似的协议或为参加此类协议作出安排；各成员应指定一中央政府机构，负责在国家一级实施本协定关于通知程序的规定，等等。

TBT第11条是关于对其他成员提供技术援助方面的规则。该条规定，在收到对方请求的情况下，各成员应就技术法规的制定向其他成员、特别是发展中国家成员提供建议。比如，就建立国家标准化机构和参加国际标准化机构的问题向其他成员、特别是发展中国家成员提供建议，并按双方同意的条款和条件给予它们技术援助；采取所能采取的合理措施，安排其领土内的管理机构向其他成员、特别是发展中国家成员提供建议，并按双方同意的条款和条件在建立管理机构或技术法规的合格评定机构方面，以及提供最好地满足其技术法规的方法方面给予技术援助。

七、卫生与动植物检疫措施

（一）概述

卫生与动植物检疫措施出现在国际贸易中已经有几百年的历史，其主要作用在于防止进口产品、容器、包装物和运输工具对进口国带来动植物病虫害方面的危害，保护进口国人民的生命健康。因防范不足导致外来动植物对进口国造成危害的教训很多，比如1978年，非洲猪瘟席卷马耳他，政府不得不下令捕杀全国所有的猪；1996年，欧洲“疯牛病”的蔓延；2003年至2005年，亚洲禽流感的肆虐，都因跨境传播给相关国家和地区造成重大危害。有鉴于此，关贸总协定在第20条中明确规定：缔约方按照协定要求所采取或实施的，为保护人类、动物或植物的生命或健康所必需的措施属于协定的一般例外。

然而实践中，有的国家借卫生与动植物检疫之名，行限制进口、保护国内产业之实。比如有意提高检疫标准，利用该措施来阻止国外动植物产品进入本国市场，导致将卫生与动植物检疫措施演变成为一种具有隐蔽性的间接贸易壁垒。GATT1994和TBT协议中，没有对卫生与动植物检疫措施问题的专门规定。为消除成员方的这种不合理限制，乌拉圭回合谈判中达成了《实施卫生与动植物检疫措施协议》（Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures，简称SPS协议），该协议就动植物检疫措施问题对成员方提出具体要求。也可以说，SPS协议是GATT原则渗透到动植物检疫工作的产物。

（二）SPS协议的目标

SPS协议重申了不应阻止各成员采纳或实施为保护人类、动物或植物的生命或健康所必须的措施的原则，同时也强调，虽然实施动植物检疫制度是必需的，但此类检疫措施不应构成对国际贸易的变相限制，其对贸易的不利影响应降到最低程度。SPS协议在序言部分阐明了协议实施的目标，具体为：建立规则和纪律的多边框架，以指导动植物卫生检疫措施的制定、采用和实施，从而使其对贸易的消极作用降到最小；进一步推动各成员使用以有关国际组织所制定的国际标准、准则和建议为基础的统一的动植物卫生检疫措施，等等。

（三）SPS协议的主要内容

SPS协议的正文由14个条款组成，另有3个附件，整体是围绕保护人身健康或安全、保护动物或植物生命或健康、保护环境这三大主题而展开的。SPS协议的内容主要是对所有的与卫生和动植物检疫有关的法律、法令、规定和程序的措施要求，特别包括最终产品标准；加工和生产方法；检测、检验、出证和批准程序；检疫处理，包括与动物或植物运输有关、或与在运输途中为维持其动植物生存所需物质有关的要求在内的检疫处理；有关统计方法、抽样程序和风险评估方法的规定；以及与食品安全直接相关的包装和标签要求。

1.成员方的基本权利与义务

成员方的基本权利与义务规定在协议第2条中。在成员方基本权利方面，该条第1款规定：Members have the right to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement。

本条第2、3款规定了成员方应履行的基本义务，具体要求为：Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, except as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5；Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail, including between their own territory and that of other Members. Sanitary and phytosanitary measures shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade。

2. 成员方的协调一致性

SPS协议第3条阐明了对成员方协调一致性的要求。

（1） Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures which result in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than would be achieved by measures based on the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations, if there is a scientific justification, or as a consequence of the level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection a Member determines to be appropriate in accordance with the relevant provisions of paragraphs 1 through 8 of Article 5. Notwithstanding the above, all measures which result in a level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection different from that which would be achieved by measures based on international standards, guidelines or recommendations shall not be inconsistent with any other provision of this Agreement （注：第5条第1款至第8款主要规定的是风险评估以及适当的动植物卫生检疫保护水平的确定问题，比如成员方若认为有关国际标准、准则或建议不足以达到合理的动植物卫生检疫保护水平，则应有科学依据，并应考虑将对贸易的不利影响减少到最低程度等）。

（2） Members shall play a full part, within the limits of their resources, in the relevant international organizations and their subsidiary bodies, in particular the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, and the international and regional organizations operating within the framework of the International Plant Protection Convention, to promote within these organizations the development and periodic review of standards, guidelines and recommendations with respect to all aspects of sanitary and phytosanitary measures.

3. 透明度

SPS协议对透明度的规定体现在第7条和附件2中。第7条规定：Members shall notify changes in their sanitary or phytosanitary measures and shall provide information on their sanitary or phytosanitary measures in accordance with the provisions of Annex B。

附件2专门针对透明度问题作出了规定：Members shall ensure that all sanitary and phytosanitary regulations which have been adopted are published promptly in such a manner as to enable interested Members to become acquainted with them；除紧急情况外，各成员应在动植物卫生检疫法规的公布和开始生效之间设置合理的时间间隔，以便让出口成员，尤其是发展中国家成员的生产商有足够的时间调整其产品和生产方法，以适应进口成员的要求。

同时，附件2中还针对咨询点的设置和通知程序作了具体要求，规定每个成员应确保设立一个咨询点，负责对感兴趣的成员提出的所有合理问题提供答复，并提供包括本成员方的动植物卫生检疫法规在内的相关文件；当国际标准、准则或建议不存在或所提议的动植物卫生检疫规定的内容与国际标准、准则或建议的内容实质上不一致，并且如果规定对其他成员的贸易有重大影响，各成员应及早发布通知，以便有关成员能知晓含有某特殊规定的法案。

4.控制、检验和批准程序

SPS协议第8条规定了各成员方实施控制、检验和批准的程序。根据规定，各成员在实施控制、检验和批准程序，包括批准在食品、饮料或饲料中使用添加剂，或确定污染物允许量的国家制度时，应遵守附件3所规定的履行程序的具体要求。并且，各成员方应确保所实施的程序不与本协议规定相抵触。

5. 发展中成员方的特殊和差别待遇

SPS协议在第10条中规定了对发展中成员方的特殊和差别待遇。

（1） In the preparation and application of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, Members shall take account of the special needs of developing country Members, and in particular of the least-developed country Members.

（2） Where the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection allows scope for the phased introduction of new sanitary or phytosanitary measures, longer time-frames for compliance should be accorded on products of interest to developing country Members so as to maintain opportunities for their exports.

（3） With a view to ensuring that developing country Members are able to comply with the provisions of this Agreement, the Committee is enabled to grant to such countries, upon request, specified, time-limited exceptions in whole or in part from obligations under this Agreement, taking into account their financial, trade and development needs.

（4） Members should encourage and facilitate the active participation of developing country Members in the relevant international organizations.

Case Study

WTO Award of the Arbitrator:

CANADA-CERTAIN MEASURES AFFECTING

THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY

Introduction

On 19 June 2000, the Dispute Settlement Body （the “DSB”） adopted the Appellate Body Report, and the Panel Report as modified by the Appellate Body Report, in Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry （“Canada - Automotive Industry”）. On 19 July 2000, Canada informed the DSB, pursuant to Article 21.3 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes （the “DSU”）, that it would implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this dispute.

At the DSB meeting of 27 July 2000, Canada said that it would require a “reasonable period of time” to do so, under the terms of Article 21.3 of the DSU, with regard to certain aspects of the measures at issue in the dispute, in particular, the DSB's recommendations pursuant to Article Ⅰ:1 and Article Ⅲ:4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 （“GATT 1994”） and Article ⅩⅦ of the General Agreement on Trade in Services （“GATS”）.

In view of the impossibility to reach an agreement with Canada on the period of time required for the implementation of those recommendations and rulings, the European Communities and Japan requested that such period be determined by binding arbitration pursuant to Article 21.3（c） of the DSU.

By joint letter of 23 August 2000,Canada, the European Communities and Japan notified the DSB that they had agreed that the duration of the “reasonable period of time” for implementation should be determined through binding arbitration, under the terms of Article 21.3（c） of the DSU, and that I should act as Arbitrator. The parties also indicated in that letter that they had agreed to extend the time period for the arbitration, fixed at 90 days by Article 21.3（c） of the DSU, until 6 October 2000. Notwithstanding this extension of the time period, the parties stated that the arbitration award would be deemed to be an award made under Article 21.3（c） of the DSU. My acceptance of this designation as Arbitrator was conveyed to the parties by letter of 24 August 2000.

Written submissions were received from Canada, the European Communities and Japan on 31 August 2000, and an oral hearing was held on 14 September 2000.

Arguments of the Parties

Canada

Canada submits that the “reasonable period of time” needed for full compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB relating to the Canadian value-added requirements （the “CVA requirements”） and the duty exemption is “11 months, 12 days”, that is, until 1 May 2001. In its written submission,Canada proposes to implement these recommendations and rulings through the repeal or amendment of the Motor Vehicles Tariff Order, 1998 （the “MVTO 1998”）and the Special Remission Orders （the “SROs”） promulgated by the Government of Canada.

Canada noted that it was on schedule to withdraw the export subsidy component of the measures, namely the production-to-sales ratio requirements, by 17 September 2000, as recommended by the DSB. However, to do so, Canada “drastically foreshortened” its normal law-making process. Canada's ability to withdraw the export subsidy component so quickly has no bearing on the “reasonable period of time” for implementing recommendations and rulings of the DSB relating to the CVA requirements and the duty exemption.

Canada argues that for these aspects of the measures at issue, the normal rules for determining a “reasonable period of time” under Article 21.3（c） arbitrations apply. According to Canada, past Arbitrators have recognized the sovereign prerogative of Members to determine the most appropriate and effective method of implementing the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, including the choice and timing of the steps necessary to do so. Canada states that the “reasonable period of time” which it has proposed is based on this rule.

…

European Communities

The European Communities notes that the DSB's recommendations gave Canada 90 days to withdraw the export subsidy component of the measures found to be inconsistent with Canada's WTO obligations. With regard to the aspects of the measures that were found to be inconsistent with Article Ⅰ:1 and Article Ⅲ:4 of the GATT 1994 and Article ⅩⅦ of the GATS, Canada's obligation was to brings its measures into conformity with its obligations under these provisions. The European Communities notes that Canada indicated that it would require a “reasonable period of time” for implementation of these aspects of the measures under Article 21.3（c）, as Canada considered that it would be “impracticable” to comply with the recommendation “immediately”.

The European Communities submits that the 15 month period mentioned in Article 21.3（c） for the “reasonable period of time” is a “guideline” for the arbitrator, not an “average” or “usual” period. The European Communities argues that past arbitrations make clear that the “reasonable period of time” should be the shortest period of time possible within the legal system of the Member to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Article 21.3（c） refers to the notion of “particular circumstances” that can influence the “reasonable period of time”. The “particular circumstances” of each case determine the length of this period.

…

Japan

Japan believes that Canada should take all necessary steps to implement all of the recommendations of the DSB within 90 days of the date of the adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body reports.

Japan notes that Canada has accepted that the measures found to be inconsistent with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures （“SCM Agreement”） will be brought into conformity within such a 90-day period, and emphasizes that all measures addressed by the Panel and the Appellate Body are administrative rather than legislative measures. For these reasons,Japan considers that all DSB recommendations and rulings should be implemented “immediately” by Canada, unless Canada can demonstrate that immediate implementation is impracticable. In Japan's view, the reference to “prompt compliance” in Article 21.1 of the DSU and previous arbitration awards establish that an implementing Member bears the burden of proving that immediate compliance is impracticable, and that the “reasonable period of time” it proposes for implementation is appropriate.

…

Reasonable Period of Time

…

As the duration of the “reasonable period of time” in this case has not been agreed by the parties, they have requested that I determine this period of time through binding arbitration under Article 21.3（c） of the DSU. Thus, the issue to be resolved in this arbitration is the following: what is the “reasonable period of time” for implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in Canada - Automotive Industry relating to Article Ⅰ:1 and Article Ⅲ:4 of the GATT 1994 and Article ⅩⅦ of the GATS?

My mandate in this arbitration is governed by Article 21.3（c） of the DSU. Article 21.3（c） provides that when the “reasonable period of time” is determined through arbitration:… a guideline for the arbitrator should be that the reasonable period of time to implement panel or Appellate Body recommendations should not exceed 15 months from the date of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report. However, that time may be shorter or longer, depending upon the particular circumstances.

Thus, when the “reasonable period of time” is determined through arbitration, the guideline for the arbitrator is that this period should not exceed 15 months from the date of adoption of the panel report and/or the Appellate Body report. This does not mean, however, that the arbitrator is obliged to grant 15 months in all cases. Article 21.3（c） makes clear that the “reasonable period of time” may be shorter or longer, depending upon the “particular circumstances”. The “particular circumstances” of a dispute may influence the determination of what is a “reasonable period of time” for implementation, as has been stated by previous Arbitrators.

…

Canada has placed great emphasis on the “significant implications” that implementation of the DSB's recommendations in this case will have for the “administration of Canada's customs regime”. Canada has explained, in detail, how implementation will cause difficulties for the ongoing “major re-engineering” of its customs operations, under which it is establishing a new system known as “Customs Self-Assessment”. This reform process was begun at the end of 1999, and the legislation necessary to effect it is scheduled to be introduced into Parliament this fall. This reform is a continuing process, with the final phase of implementation to begin in late April 2001, and the testing of the system with clients to continue through 2004.The relevance of the implementation of this new customs administration system to Canada's argument on the “reasonable period of time” for implementation is not clear. In its written submission, Canada appears to be arguing that the establishment of the new customs system would require a delay in implementation of the DSB's recommendations in this case. However, in response to questioning at the oral hearing, Canada stated that implementation of the DSB's recommendations would occur sooner as a result of the adoption of the new customs administration system, if I accept the “reasonable period of time” proposed by Canada.

Regardless of Canada's specific argument on this issue, I wish to emphasize that factors unrelated to an assessment of the shortest period of time possible for a Member to implement, within its legal system, the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in a particular case are irrelevant to determining the “reasonable period of time” under Article 21.3（c） of the DSU. While it might be more convenient for Canada to implement the DSB's recommendations in this case on the same timeline as it has planned for the reform of its customs administration regime, this factor is not relevant in determining the “shortest period possible” within Canada's legal system for implementation of the DSB's recommendations. As noted by the Arbitrator in Canada - Pharmaceutical Patents, the determination of the “reasonable period of time” for implementation must be a legal judgment based on an examination of relevant legal requirements.

The Award

I determine that the “reasonable period of time” for Canada to implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB relating to Article Ⅰ:1 and Article Ⅲ:4 of the GATT 1994 and Article ⅩⅦ of the GATS in this case is 8 months from the date of adoption of the Appellate Body Report and the Panel Report, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, by the DSB on 19 June 2000. The “reasonable period of time” will thus expire on 19 February 2001.

Signed in the original at Geneva this 18th day of September 2000 by:

Julio Lacarte-Muró

Questions:

1. What's your opinion about the influence of this case to China?

2. What's the main principles of WTO can you summarize from this case?

【复习思考题】

1.如何看待世界贸易组织关税承诺表？

2.《原产地规则协议》的核心规则有哪些？

3.技术性贸易措施的影响有哪些？

4.《实施卫生与动植物检疫措施协议》的作用有哪些？

5.如何正确理解并适用《海关估价协定》的规定？

[1] Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, Article 2 （9）, （11）, （12）.

[2] Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, Article 2 （15）-（18）.