[151] N.H.Gibbs，Grand Strategy，Vol.1，p.402.
[152] CAB 24/247，C.P.64（34），Report of the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee，28th February，1934；CAB 24/259，C.P.26（36），Annex：Programmes of the Defence Services-Interim Report，24th July，1935；CAB 24/259，C.P.26（36），Programmes of the Defence Services：Third Report of Defence Requirements Sub-Committee，21st November，1935.
[153] N.H.Gibbs，Grand Strategy，Vol.1，pp.409-414.
[154] CAB 53/32/4，C.O.S.596，Appreciation of the Situation in the Far East 1937：Report by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee，14th June，1937.
[155] S.Woodburn Kirby，The War against Japan，Vol.1，p.19.
[156] N.H.Gibbs，Grand Strategy，Vol.1，pp.421-423.
[157] Robert Self，ed.，The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters，Vol.4，Chamberlain to Ida，12 Feb，1934，p.380.
[158] 该委员会隶属帝国国防委员会，主席为国防协调大臣查特菲尔德勋爵，成员有掌玺大臣约翰·安德森（John Anderson）、陆军大臣霍尔-贝利沙（Hore-Belisha）、海军大臣斯坦诺普勋爵、空军大臣金斯利·伍德（Kingsley Wood）、兰开斯特郡大臣莫里森（W.S.Morrison）和三军参谋长，布里奇斯爵士（Sir E.Bridges）任秘书。
[159] N.H.Gibbs，Grand Strategy，Vol.1，pp.423-425.
[160] N.H.Gibbs，Grand Strategy，Vol.1，pp.425-426.
[161] S.Woodburn Kirby，The War against Japan，Vol.1，p.19.
[162] CAB 53/50/7，C.O.S.928，Report by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee：The Situation in the Far East，18th June，1939；C.O.S.931，Report by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee：The Situation in the Far East，24th June，1939.英法参谋会谈中，法国主张在远东采取防御态势，依靠苏联尤其是美国遏制日本直到意大利被打败，英国则强调地中海和远东并重。最后达成一致的是：远东的战略是防御性质的，英法压倒一切的是在西方，不轻易作出削弱英国东地中海舰队的决定。
[163] S.Woodburn Kirby，The War against Japan，Vol.1，p.20.
[164] CAB 53/52/2，C.O.S.941，Franco-British Conference at Singapore June，1939：Note by Scretary Covering Report，11th July，1939.
[165] N.H.Gibbs，Grand Strategy，Vol.1，p.431.
[166] S.Woodburn Kirby，The War against Japan，Vol.1，p.22.
[167] Christopher Thorne，Allies of a Kind：The United States，Britain and the War against Japan，1941-1945，pp.3-4.
[168] 扬·克里斯蒂安·史末资是出身南非的政治家、军事家，1917年3月被英国首相劳合·乔治邀请加入战时内阁，后负责英国本土防空事务，8月17日提交“史末资报告”，主张成立一支独立的空军。1918年1月2日空军部成立，首任空军大臣（Air Minister）是罗瑟米尔勋爵（Lord Rothermere），1919年1月10日空军大臣（Secretary of State for Air）成为内阁大臣级职位，陆军大臣温斯顿·丘吉尔兼任该职。1964年4月1日，空军部被合并进国防部，空军大臣职位随之取消。
[169] Phillip S.Meilinger，“Trenchard and ‘Morale Bombing’：The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War Ⅱ”，The Joural of Military History，Vol.60，No.2.（Apr.，1996），p.246.
[170] Ian M.Philpott，The Royal Air Force：An Encyclopedia of the Inter-War Years，Vol.2：Re-armament 1930 to 1939，South Yorkshire：Pen & Sword Books Ltd.，2008，p.1.
[171] Andrew Boyle，Trenchard：Man of Vision，London：Collins，1962，p.232.
[172] Phillip S.Meilinger，“Trenchard and ‘Morale Bombing’：The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War Ⅱ”，The Joural of Military History，Vol.60，No.2.（Apr.，1996），p.251.
[173] N.H.Gibbs，Grand Strategy，Vol.1，p.46.
[174] Ian M.Philpott，The Royal Air Force：An Encyclopedia of the Inter-War Years，Vol.2，p.ix.
[175] Basil Collier，The Defense of the United Kingdom，London：Her Majesty's Stationery Office，1957，p.5.
[176] CAB 24/131，C.P.3570（21），Interim Report of Committee on National Expenditure，14th December，1921.
[177] C.L.Mowat，Britain between the Wars，1918-1940，London：Methuen，1955，p.130.“格迪斯之斧”，源于国家支出委员会主席、首任运输大臣格迪斯（1921年11月辞去运输大臣职务）的一句话：“政府的厉行节约只是用大头针刮擦问题，反之，我们要用斧头来解决问题。”皇家空军在1919年镇压索马里起义时，只用了7架飞机就取得了成功，一共花了7.7万英镑，原本预算为600万英镑，预计陆军需要3到4个师。
[178] CAB 23/29，C.C.18（22）1，15th March，1922.
[179] CAB 24/158，C.P.88（23），Appendix 1：Lord Balfour on the Air Menace，May 1922.
[180] CAB 23/29，C.C.18（22）2，15th March，1922.
[181] Phillip S.Meilinger，“Trenchard and ‘Morale Bombing’：The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War Ⅱ”，The Joural of Military History，Vol.60，No.2.（Apr.，1996），p.254.
[182] John R.Ferris，The Evolution of British Strategic Policy，1919-26，p.108.
[183] CAB 23/30，C.C.43（22）18，3rd August，1922；CAB 24/158，C.P.88（23），Air Policy and a One-Power Air Standard：Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air，February 1923.
[184] Basil Collier，The Defense of the United Kingdom，pp.13-14.
[185] Colin Sinnott，The RAF and Aircraft Design，1923-1939：Air Staff Operational Requirements，London：Frank Cass，2001，p.10.
[186] CAB 24/158，C.P.88（23），Air Policy and a One-Power Air Standard：Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air，February 1923.
[187] CAB 24/160，C.P.270（23），National and Imperial Defence Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence：Interim Report，12th June，1923.法国空军飞机数量的准确数字是596架。
[188] CAB 24/160，C.P.294（23），The Expansion of the Royal Air Force for Home Defence：Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War，15th June，1923.
[189] CAB 23/46，C.C.32（23）1，20th June，1923；Hansard，HL Deb，26th June，1923，Series 5，Vol.54，c.571.
[190] Malcolm Smith，British Air Strategy between the Wars，p.32.
[191] CAB 24/164，C.P.82（24），Imperial Conference，1923-Air Defence：Statement by the Secretary of State for Air，19th October，1923.
[192] CAB 24/207，C.P.355（29），Proposal to Postpone the Completion of the Royal Air Force Scheme of Expansion for Home Defence Until 1938，5th December，1929.
[193] CAB 24/175，C.P.421（25），Air Force Expansion for Home Defence：Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air，October 1925.
[194] CAB 24/175，C.P.498（25），Expansion of the Air Force for Home Defence by Birkenhead Committee，November 1925.
[195] CAB 23/51，C.C.57（25）7，3rd December，1925.
[196] CAB 24/207，C.P.355（29），Proposal to Postpone the Completion of the Royal Air Force Scheme of Expansion for Home Defence Until 1938，5th December，1929；CAB 23/62，C.C.52（29）3，11th December，1929.
[197] N.H.Gibbs，Grand Strategy，Vol.1，pp.63-64.
[198] Anthony Clayton，The British Empire as a Superpower，1919-1939，p.255.
[199] CAB 24/247，C.P.64（34），Report of the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee，28th February，1934.
[200] Hansard，HC Deb，20th February，1934，Vol.286，c.188W.
[201] 航空师下辖1个或多个航空团（联队），航空团则下辖3个大队（1944年扩大为4个大队），大队下面有4个中队，1个中队大约有12架飞机（包括3架左右的非一线飞机）。不同的国家和不同的机型（比如战斗机和轰炸机），甚至不同的历史时期，1个中队所包括的飞机数量都不尽相同。
[202] Wesley K.Wark，“British Intelligence on the German Air Force and Aircraft Industry，1933-1939”，The Historical Journal，Vol.25，No.3.（Sept.，1982），p.631；Stephen Roskill，Hankey：Man of Secrets，Vol.3，London：Collins，1974，p.103.外交部常务次官范西塔特有自己的情报网络，他质疑埃林顿的估计，认为他对英国空军的实力过于乐观了。空军部和外交部在对德国空军力量的情报分析上，一直存在分歧。
[203] CAB 23/78，C.C.10（34）3，19th March，1934；CAB 34/79，C.C.18（34）3/4，30th April，1934.
[204] Philip Williamson and Edward Baldwin，eds.，Baldwin Papers，p.291.
[205] Robert Self，ed.，The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters，Vol.4，Chamberlain to Hilda，1 July，1934，p.77.“疯狂紧追”意指德国在“军备平等”的幌子下扩军备战。
[206] Robert Self，ed.，The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters，Vol.4，Chamberlain to Hilda，28 July，1934，p.82.
[207] CAB 24/250，C，P.193（34），Interim Report by the Ministerial Committee on Disarmament Dealing with Air Defence，16th July，1934；CAB 23/79，C.C.29（34）3，18th July，1934.
[208] Ian M.Philpott，The Royal Air Force：An Encyclopedia of the Inter-War Years，Vol.2，p.45；Basil Collier，The Defense of the United Kingdom，p.28；Malcolm Smith，British Air Strategy between the Wars，p.328.“五十二中队计划”中，轰炸机为394架，战斗机为204架。
[209] Hansard，HC Deb，30th July，1934，Vol.292，c.2339；Philip Williamson and Edward Baldwin，eds.，Baldwin Papers，p.322.
[210] Phillip S.Meilinger，“Trenchard and ‘Morale Bombing’：The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War Ⅱ”，The Joural of Military History，Vol.60，No.2.（Apr.，1996），p.247.
[211] Ian M.Philpott，The Royal Air Force：An Encyclopedia of the Inter-War Years，Vol.2，p.44.
[212] Stephen Roskill，Hankey：Man of Secrets，Vol.3，p.119.
[213] Robert Self，ed.，The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters，Vol.4，Chamberlain to Ida，26 Mar，1939，p.395.
[214] Wesley K.Wark，“British Intelligence on the German Air Force and Aircraft Industry，1933-1939”，The Historical Journal，Vol.25，No.3.（Sept.，1982），p.632.
[215] Hansard，HC Deb，28th November，1934，Vol.295，c.883.
[216] CAB 23/80，C.C.42（34）2，26th November，1934.
[217] DBFP，Series C，Vol.3，pp.1072-1073；[英]安东尼·艾登：《艾登回忆录——面对独裁者》上卷，武雄、毓文、曼罗等译，陈尧光校，商务印书馆1977年版，第260页。
[218] Malcolm Smith，British Air Strategy between the Wars，p.155.
[219] Ian M.Philpott，The Royal Air Force：An Encyclopedia of the Inter-War Years，Vol.2，pp.44-46.
[220] CAB 24/254，C.P.85（35），The German Air Programme and Its Bearing on British Air Strength，15th April，1935.
[221] Ian M.Philpott，The Royal Air Force：An Encyclopedia of the Inter-War Years，Vol.2，p.45；CAB 24/255，C.P.100（35），Sub-Committee on Air Parity of Ministerial Committee on Defence Requirements：Interim Report，8th May，1935；CAB 24/255，C.P.103（35），Second Interim Report，17th May，1935；CAB 23/81，C.C.29（35）1，21st May，1935.
[222] CAB 24/254，C.P.C.P.85（35），Memorandum by the Chief of the Air Staff，15th April，1935.
[223] Malcolm Smith，“The Royal Air Force，Air Power and British Foreign Policy，1932-1937”，Journal of Contemporary History，Vol.12，No.1（Jan.，1977），p.164.
[224] N.H.Gibbs，Grand Strategy，Vol.1，pp.176，561.
[225] Basil Collier，The Defense of the United Kingdom，p.31.
[226] CAB 24/259，C.P.26（36），Programmes of the Defence Services：Third Report of Defence Requirements Sub-Committee，21st November，1935.
[227] CAB 24/259，C.P.27（36），Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air：Air Striking Force，10th February，1936.
[228] CAB 23/83，C.C.10（36）1，25th February，1936；Ian M.Philpott，The Royal Air Force：An Encyclopedia of the Inter-War Years，Vol.2，pp.45-46；Malcolm Smith，British Air Strategy between the Wars，p.330.
[229] Wesley K.Wark，“British Intelligence on the German Air Force and Aircraft Industry，1933-1939”，The Historical Journal，Vol.25，No.3.（Sept.，1982），p.638.
[230] CAB 24/267，C.P.18（37），Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air：Plan for Further Expansion of First Line Strength of the Royal Air Force，14th January，1937；Ian M.Philpott，The Royal Air Force：An Encyclopedia of the Inter-War Years，Vol.2，pp.45，70；Malcolm Smith，British Air Strategy between the Wars，p.331.
[231] CAB 24/268，C.P.69（37），Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air，11th February，1937；CAB23/87，C.C.5（37）12，3rd February，1937；C.C.9（37）5，24th February，1937.
[232] Wesley K.Wark，“British Intelligence on the German Air Force and Aircraft Industry，1933-1939”，The Historical Journal，Vol.25，No.3.（Sept.，1982），p.639.
[233] CAB 24/273，C.P.316（37），Memorandum by Secretary of State for Air，27th October，1937/Air Staff Memorandum，12th October，1937；Ian M.Philpott，The Royal Air Force：An Encyclopedia of the Inter-War Years，Vol.2，pp.45，70-71；Malcolm Smith，British Air Strategy between the Wars，p.332.
[234] CAB 24/273，C.P.316（37），Interim Report by the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence，15th December，1937.
[235] CAB 23/90a，C.C.48（37）9/C.C.49（37）1，22nd December，1937.
[236] CAB 63/52，Aide-Memoire：Future Programmes of Our Defence Services，3rd December，1937.英国学者罗斯基尔认为，汉基是第一个提出上述看法的政府官员，见Stephen Roskill，Hankey：Man of Secrets，Vol.3，p.285.
[237] [美]戴维·麦基萨克：《来自蓝天中央的声音：空权理论家》，见[美]彼得·帕雷特主编，[美]戈登·A·克雷格、[美]费利克斯·吉尔伯特编：《现代战略的缔造者：从马基雅维利到核时代》，时殷弘等译，世界知识出版社2006年版，第618页。
[238] Malcolm Smith，British Air Strategy between the Wars，p.197；Malcolm Smith，“The Royal Air Force，Air Power and British Foreign Policy，1932-1937”，Journal of Contemporary History，Vol.12，No.1（Jan.，1977），p.170.作者认为这一变化对英国在慕尼黑这样的谈判产生了不利影响，因为英国注重战斗机防御，就失去了轰炸机报复性轰炸的威慑。
[239] N.H.Gibbs，Grand Strategy，Vol.1，p.572.
[240] CAB 24/274，C.P.24（38），Appendix Ⅳ：Revised Proposals Based on the Recommendations of the Minister for Co-operation of Defence，21st January，1938.
[241] CAB 23/92，C.C.5（38）9，16th February，1938.
[242] CAB 24/275，C.P.68（38），Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air，12th March，1938.
[243] CAB 23/92，C.C.13（38）3，14th March，1938；Ian M.Philpott，The Royal Air Force：An Encyclopedia of the Inter-War Years，Vol.2，pp.45，72-73；Malcolm Smith，British Air Strategy between the Wars，p.334.
[244] CAB 24/276，C.P.86（38），Memorandum by the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence，1st April，1938；C.P.87（38），Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer，4th April，1938；CAB 23/93，C.C.18（38）8，6th April，1938.
[245] CAB 23/93，C.C.21（38）6，27th April，1938.
[246] Malcolm Smith，British Air Strategy between the Wars，p.214.
[247] Hansard，HL Deb，12th May 1938，Vol.108，cc.1042-1103.
[248] Robert Self，ed.，The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters，Vol.4，Chamberlain to Ida，10[？15] May，1938，p.322.
[249] CAB 24/279，C.P.218（38），Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air，25th October，1938；Ian M.Philpott，The Royal Air Force：An Encyclopedia of the Inter-War Years，Vol.2，pp.45，73；Malcolm Smith，British Air Strategy between the Wars，p.335.
[250] CAB 24/280，C.P.247（38），Report of Cabinet Committee，3rd November，1938：Appendix-Minute by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
[251] Wesley K.Wark，“British Intelligence on the German Air Force and Aircraft Industry，1933-1939”，The Historical Journal，Vol.25，No.3.（Sept.，1982），pp.645-646.“二战”爆发时，德国空军一线飞机是3 647架。
[252] CAB 23/96，C.C.53（38）2，7th November，1938.
[253] Malcolm Smith，British Air Strategy between the Wars，p.109.
[254] J.P.D.Dunbabin，“British Rearmament in the 1930s：A Chronology and Review”，The Historical Journal，Vol.18，No.3（Sep.，1975），p.592.
[255] Robert Self，ed.，The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters，Vol.4，Chamberlain to Hilda，9 Feb，1936，p.175.
[256] CAB 24/265，C.P.334（36），Memorandum by Mr.Neville Chamberlain，11th December，1936.
[257] [英]W·N·梅德利科特：《英国现代史（1914—1964）》，第358页。
[258] Sebastian Cox，“British Military Planning and the Origins of the Second World War”，in B.J.C.Mckercher and Roch Legault，eds.，Military Planning and the Origins of the Second World War in Europe，Westport，Connecticut：Praeger Publisher，2001，p.107.
[259] Michael Howard，The Continental Commitment，p.125.
[260] Williamson Murray，Luftwaffe，South Carolina：The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co.of America，1985，p.1.关于战前德国空军的战略和发展问题可见该书pp.1-23.
[261] Brian Bond，British Military Policy between the Two World Wars，p.283.
[262] George C.Peden，“The Burden of Imperial Defence and the Continental Commitment Reconsidered”，The Historical Journal，Vol.27，No.2（Jun.，1984），p.409.
[263] Malcolm Smith，“The Royal Air Force，Air Power and British Foreign Policy，1932-1937”，Journal of Contemporary History，Vol.12，No.1（Jan.，1977），p.158.
[264] Malcolm Smith，British Air Strategy between the Wars，pp.139，173.
[265] R.J.Overy，“German Air Force 1933 to 1939”，The Historical Journal，Vol.27，No.2.（Jun.，1984），pp.465-471；R.J.Overy，“The German Pre-war Aircraft Production Plans：November 1936-April 1939”，The English Historical Review，Vol.90，No.357.（Oct.，1975），pp.778-797.
[266] Michael Howard，The Continental Commitment，p.111.
[267] Anthony Clayton，The British Empire as a Superpower，1919-1939，pp.252-253.
[268] [英]保罗·肯尼迪：《大国的兴衰》，第326页。
[269] Charles Webster and Noble Frankland，Strategic Air Offensive against Germany，Vol.1：Preparation，London：Her Majesty's Stationery Office，1961，p.91.
[270] Sebastian Cox，“British Military Planning and the Origins of the Second World War”，in B.J.C.Mckercher and Roch Legault，eds.，Military Planning and the Origins of the Second World War in Europe，p.114.
[271] Albert V.Tucker，“Army and Society in England，1870-1900：A Reassessment of the Cardwell Reforms”，The Journal of British Studies，Vol.12，No.2（May，1963），p.111.
[272] Geoffrey P.Megargee，The Army before Last：British Military Policy，1919-1939 and Its Relevance for the U.S.Army Today，pp.1-2.
[273] Hastings L.Ismay，The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay，New York：The Viking Press，1960，p.94.
[274] Brian Bond，British Military Policy between the Two World Wars，p.41.
[275] CAB 23/15，W.C.616A，Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet，15th August，1919.
[276] CAB 24/159，C.P.200（23），Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War，17th April，1923.
[277] Anthony Clayton，The British Empire as a Superpower，1919-1939，pp.27-28.
[278] N.H.Gibbs，Grand Strategy，Vol.1，p.52.
[279] A.J.P.Taylor，English History，1914-1945，p.222.
[280] CAB 53/12/8，C.O.S.36，Memo by Foreign Office for Chiefs of Staff Annual Review of Defence Policy 1926，16th April，1926.
[281] CAB 53/12/10，C.O.S.41，Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee Review of Imperial Defence，22nd June，1926.
[282] CAB 24/188，C.P.207（27），Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War，19th July，1927.
[283] CAB 23/55，C.C.45（27）5，28th July，1927.
[284] Michael Howard，The Continental Commitment，pp.90-91.
[285] Michael Howard，The Continental Commitment，p.91.
[286] Brian Bond，British Military Policy between the Two World Wars，p.31.
[287] A.J.P.Taylor，English History，1914-1945，p.229.
[288] CAB 53/22/10，C.O.S.295，Imperial Defence Policy：Annual Review for 1932 by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee，23rd February，1932；CAB 24/229，C.P.104（32），Imperial Defence Policy：Note by Sir M.Hankey，17th March，1932.
[289] CAB 24/247，C.P.64（34），Report of the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee，28th February，1934.
[290] [英]布赖恩·邦德和马丁·亚历山大：《利德尔·哈特和戴高乐：有限义务与机动防御》，见[美]彼得·帕雷特主编，[美]戈登·A·克雷格、[美]费利克斯·吉尔伯特编：《现代战略的缔造者：从马基雅维利到核时代》，第595页。
[291] N.H.Gibbs，Grand Strategy，Vol.1，p.111；Michael Howard，The Continental Commitment，p.107.
[292] Anthony Adamthwaite，ed.，British Documents on Foreign Affairs：Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential Print（以下简为BDFA），Part Ⅱ，Series F，Vol.30，Frederick，Maryland：University Publications of America，1993，pp.64-67.
[293] CAB 23/79，C.C.23（34）2，6th June，1934；C.C.26（34）4，27th June，1934.
[294] CAB 53/24/3，C.O.S.343，Report by the Chiefs of Staff：Strategical Implications of a Declaration Concerning Belgian Security，7th July，1934；CAB 24/249，C.P.175（34），Strategical Implications of a Declaration Concerning Belgian Security：Note by Sir M.Hankey，9th July，1934.
[295] CAB 23/79，C.C.28（34）2，11th July，1934.
[296] 爱德华·卡德维尔（Edward Cardwell），1868—1874年任英国陆军大臣。任职期间进行了一系列陆军现代化的改革，废除了贵族阶层购买军职和花钱晋升的制度，将陆军总司令从王室控制下纳入陆军部管辖之下，制订6年预备队再6年正规军的服役规定，并建立一对一的制度，例如海外一个营，那么在国内相应有一个营的预备力量，然后定期轮换。它的缺点随“一战”后英国海外义务的增加而显现，详细见Albert V.Tucker，“Army and Socirty in England，1870-1900：A Reassessment of the Cardwell Reforms”，The Journal of British Studies，Vol.12，No.2.（May，1963），pp.110-141；Thomas F.Gallagher，“Cardwellian Mysteries：The Fate of the British Army Regulation Bill，1871”，The Historical Journal，Vol.18，No.2（Jun.，1975），pp.327-348.
[297] N.H.Gibbs，Grand Strategy，Vol.1，pp.114-117；Michael Howard，The Continental Commitment，pp.108-110.
[298] CAB 23/79，C.C.31（34）1 and Appendix，31st July，1934.
[299] Brian Bond，British Military Policy between the Two World Wars，pp.208-212.
[300] CAB 24/259，C.P.26（36），Programmes of the Defence Services：Third Report of Defence Requirements Sub-Committee，21st November，1935.
[301] CAB 23/83，C.C.10（36）1，25th February，1936.
[302] Robert Self，ed.，The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters，Vol.4，Chamberlain to Hilda，9 Feb，1934，p.175.
[303] [英]利德尔·哈特：《战略论：间接路线战略》，中国人民解放军军事科学院译，战士出版社1981年版，第482页。
[304] Brian Bond，Liddell Hart：A Study of His Military Thought，New Jersey：Rutgers University Press，1977，ch.3：The British Way in Warfare 1930-34，pp.65-85，and ch.4：Limited Liability 1935-39，pp.88-115.
[305] Keith Feiling，The Life of Neville Chamberlain，p.313.
[306] CAB 24/265，C.P.334（36），Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the Role of the British Army，11th December，1936.
[307] CAB 53/30/5，C.O.S.550，Report by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee：Role of the British Army，28th January，1937；CAB 24/267，C.P.41（37），Report by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee：Role of the British Army，28th January，1937.
[308] CAB 24/267，C.P.46（37），Memorandum by the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence，2nd February，1937.
[309] CAB 23/87，C.C.5（37）14，3rd February，1937.
[310] CAB 24/269，C.P.115（37），Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War，23rd April，1937.
[311] CAB 23/88，C.C.20（37）4，5th May，1937.
[312] Robert Self，ed.，The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters，Vol.4，Chamberlain to Ida，6 Feb，1937，p.233.
[313] Brian Bond，British Military Policy between the Two World Wars，p.225.
[314] Robert Self，ed.，The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters，Vol.4，Chamberlain to Hilda，30 May，1937，p.251.
[315] Stephen Roskill，Hankey：Man of Secrets，Vol.3，p.290.
[316] J.P.D.Dunbabin，“British Rearmament in the 1930s：A Chronology and Review”，The Historical Journal，Vol.18，No.3（Sep.，1975），p.602.
[317] N.H.Gibbs，Grand Strategy，Vol.1，p.495.
[318] Stephen Roskill，Hankey：Man of Secrets，Vol.3，pp.285，291.
[319] [英]安东尼·艾登：《艾登回忆录——面对独裁者》下卷，第875页。
[320] CAB 24/273，C.P.316（37），Interim Report by the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence，15th December，1937.
[321] CAB 23/90a，C.C.48（37）9/C.C.49（37）1，22nd December，1937.
[322] CAB 24/274，C.P.26（38），Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War：The Organization of the Army for Its Role in War，10th February，1938.
[323] CAB 23/93，C.C.16（38）6，23rd March，1938.
[324] Brian Bond，British Military Policy between the Two World Wars，p.270.
[325] Uri Bialer，“The British Chiefs of Staff and the ‘Limited Liability’ Formula of 1938，a Note”，Military Affairs，Vol.42，No.2（Apr.，1978），pp.98-99.英国在海岸部署了51个雷达站，并由一个中央控制室与战斗机指挥系统有效地联系在一起。
[326] Talbot Imlay，“The Making of the Anglo-French Alliance，1938-39”，in Martin S.Alexander and W.J.Philpott，eds.，Anglo-French Defence Relations between the Wars，New York：Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.，2002，p.101.
[327] CAB 53/24/3，C.O.S.343，Report by the Chiefs of Staff：Strategical Implications of a Declaration Concerning Belgian Security，7th July，1934；CAB 24/249，C.P.175（34），Strategical Implications of a Declaration Concerning Belgian Security：Note by Sir M.Hankey，9th July，1934.
[328] [英]安东尼·艾登：《艾登回忆录——面对独裁者》下卷，第620、625页。
[329] 周以光：《法国在莱茵兰事件中采取的退让政策及其经济背景》，齐世荣主编：《绥靖政策研究》，第119页。
[330] CAB 23/83，C.C.28（36）3 and Appendix，8th April，1936.
[331] CAB 24/261，C.P.110（36），The Staff Conversations with French and Belgium Representatives，20th April，1936.
[332] Talbot Imlay，“The Making of the Anglo-French Alliance，1938-39”，in Martin S.Alexander and W.J.Philpott，eds.，Anglo-French Defence Relations between the Wars，p.99.
[333] CAB 53/36/4，C.O.S.680，Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee：Staff Conversations with France and Belgium，4th February，1938；CAB 24/274，C.P.35（38），Staff Conversations with France and Belgium：Note by Sir M.Hankey，14th February，1938.
[334] Michael Howard，The Continental Commitment，p.118.
[335] CAB 23/92，C.C.5（38）12，16th February，1938.
[336] CAB 23/93，C.C.18（38）7，6th April，1938.
[337] CAB 24/276，C.P.94（38），Annex I：Conclusions of the 319th Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence Held on the 11th April，1938；Annex Ⅲ：Report of Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee：Staff Conversations with France and Belgium，8th April，1938；CAB 23/93，C.C.19（38）4，13th April，1938.
[338] CAB 24/276，C.P.109（38），Record of an Anglo-French Conversation，28th and 29th April，1938.
[339] CAB 23/93，C.C.，26（38）4，25th May，1938.
[340] Robert Self，ed.，The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters，Vol.4，Chamberlain to Hilda，6 Nov，1938，p.361.
[341] CAB 24/280，C.P.269（38），Record of the Anglo-French Conversations 24th November 1938；E.L.Woodward and Rohan Butler，eds.，Documents British on Foreign Policy，1919-1939（DBFP），Third Series，Vol.3，London：His Majesty's Stationery Office，1950，pp.291-292.
[342] Talbot Imlay，“The Making of the Anglo-French Alliance，1938-39”，in Martin S.Alexander and W.J.Philpott，eds.，Anglo-French Defence Relations between the Wars，p.107.
[343] Brian Bond，British Military Policy between the Two World Wars，pp.272，279.
[344] CAB 24/283，C.P.28（39），Report of Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee：State of Preparedness of the Army in Relation to Its Role，25th January，1939.
[345] Talbot Imlay，“The Making of the Anglo-French Alliance，1938-39”，in Martin S.Alexander and W.J.Philpott，ed.，Anglo-French Defence Relations between the Wars，p.107.
[346] BDFA，Part 2，Series F，Vol.23，pp.219-224.
[347] CAB 53/44/7，C.O.S.833，Report by the Chiefs of Staff：The Strategic Position of France in a European War，1st Februrary，1939.
[348] CAB 53/44/4，C.O.S.829，Report of Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee：German Aggression against Holland，24th January，1939；CAB 24/282，C.P.20（39），German Aggression against Holland：Note by the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence，24th January，1939.
[349] CAB 53/44/4，C.O.S.830，Report of Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee：German Aggression against Holland，25th January，1939；CAB 24/282，C.P.3（39），Report by the Foreign Policy Committee，27th January，1939.
[350] CAB 23/97，C.C.2（39）1，25th January，1939.
[351] CAB 23/97，C.C.3（39）1，1st February，1939.
[352] CAB 24/282，C.P.27（39），Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War，13th December，1938.机动师的力量包括9个坦克营、1个装甲车团、2个步兵营和2个炮兵团，改编后的较小规模的2个机动师各有6个坦克营，其余组成力量作相应的分配。
[353] CAB 53/44/3，C.O.S.827，Report of Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee：State of Preparedness of the Army in Relation to Its Role，25th January，1939；CAB 24/283，C.P.28（39），Note by the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence，28th January，1939.
[354] CAB 24/283，C.P.34（39），Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War：Measures to Accelerate the Despatch of the Field Force to the Continent，1st February，1939.
[355] CAB 23/97，C.C.5（39）3，2nd February，1939.
[356] CAB 24/283，C.P.49（39），Memorandum by the Prime Minister：The State of Preparedness of the Army in Relation to Its Role，18th February，1939.
[357] CAB 23/97，C.C.8（39）6，22nd February，1939.
[358] [英]基斯·米德尔马斯：《绥靖战略》，复旦大学国际政治系译，上海译文出版社1978年版，第766页。
[359] Michael Howard，The Continental Commitment，p.128.
[360] CAB 23/98，C.C.15（39）5，29th March，1939.
[361] Robert Self，ed.，The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters，Vol.4，Chamberlain to Hilda，19 Mar，1939，p.394.
[362] N.H.Gibbs，Grand Strategy，Vol.1，p.515.
[363] Robert Self，ed.，The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters，Vol.4，Chamberlain to Hilda，1 Aug，1937，p.264.
[364] Brian Bond and Williamson Murray，“The British Armed Force，1918-39”，in Allan R.Millett and W.Murray，eds.，Military Effectiveness，Vol.2，Boston：Allen & Unwin，1990，p.100.
[365] Michael Howard，The Continental Commitment，pp.119-120，122.
[366] N.H.Gibbs，Grand Strategy，Vol.1，p.51.
[367] [英]W·N·梅德利科特：《英国现代史（1914—1964）》，第358页。
[368] [英]保罗·肯尼迪：《大国的兴衰》，第309页。
[369] Geoffrey P.Megargee，The Army before Last：British Military Policy，1919-1939 and Its Relevance for the U.S.Army Today，pp.10，22.
[370] Brian Bond，British Military Policy between the Two World Wars，p.289.
[371] Brian Bond，British Military Policy between the Two World Wars，pp.279，283，313，316.
[372] Michael Howard，The Continental Commitment，p.127.