Bertrand Russell

Pre-reading

Bertrand Russell (May 1872-February 1970) was British philosopher, mathematician, historian, writer and political activist. Russell is best known for his work in mathematical logic and analytic philosophy, and he is considered as one of the founders of analytic philosophy and is widely held to be one of the 20th century’s premier logicians. His work has had a profound influence on logic, mathematics and philosophy. Over the course of a long and prolific career, Russell has also made significant contributions to a broad range of other subjects, including linguistics, artificial intelligence, cognitive science, computer science, history, ethics, political theory, educational theory and religious studies. Generations of readers have benefited from his many popular writings on a wide variety of topics in both the humanities and the natural sciences. In 1950 Russell was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature “in recognition of his varied and significant writings in which he champions humanitarian ideals and freedom of thought”.

Between 1920 and 1921, Russell was invited to come to China to visit and deliver lectures. In October 1920, Russell came to Nanjing University (then the State Southeast University) and delivered a lecture titled On philosophy, advocating seeking knowledge through logical and scientific methods. Russell was an honest admirer of Chinese culture and deeply appreciated Chinese educational tradition and sense of humor.

Prompts for Your Reading

1.What are “ ‘practical’ men” (Paragraph 3) like?

2.What kind of knowledge is the study of philosophy aimed at?

3.What are some of the questions philosophy concerns itself with?

4.What would his life and the world be like to a man who has no tincture of philosophy?

5.How does philosophic contemplation differ from self-assertion?

6.What is meant by “the abstract and universal knowledge”? What is meant by “the knowledge brought by the senses”? (Paragraph 10)

7.What is meant by “freedom and impartiality in the world of action and emotion”(Paragraph 11)?

8.What is universal citizenship? How can it be formed?

[1] Having now come to the end of our brief and very incomplete review of the problems of philosophy, it will be well to consider, in conclusion, what is the value of philosophy and why it ought to be studied. It is the more necessary to consider this question, in view of1 the fact that many men, under the influence of science or of practical affairs, are inclined to doubt whether philosophy is anything better than innocent but useless trifling, hair-splitting distinctions, and controversies on matters concerning which knowledge is impossible2.

[2] This view of philosophy appears to result, partly from a wrong conception of the ends of life, partly from a wrong conception of the kind of goods3 which philosophy strives to achieve. Physical science, through the medium of inventions, is useful to innumerable people who are wholly ignorant of it; thus the study of physical science is to be recommended, not only, or primarily, because of the effect on the student, but rather because of the effect on mankind in general. This utility does not belong to philosophy. If the study of philosophy has any value at all for others than students of philosophy, it must be only indirectly, through its effects upon the lives of those who study it. It is in these effects, therefore, if anywhere, that the value of philosophy must be primarily sought.

[3] But further, if we are not to fail in our endeavor to determine the value of philosophy, we must first free our minds from the prejudices of what are wrongly called“practical” men. The “practical” man, as this word is often used, is one who recognizes only material needs, who realizes that men must have food for the body, but is oblivious of the necessity of providing food for the mind. If all men were well off, if poverty and disease had been reduced to their lowest possible point, there would still remain much to be done to produce a valuable society; and even in the existing world the goods of the mind are at least as important as the goods of the body. It is exclusively among the goods of the mind that the value of philosophy is to be found; and only those who are not indifferent to these goods can be persuaded that the study of philosophy is not a waste of time.

[4] Philosophy, like all other studies, aims primarily at knowledge. The knowledge it aims at is the kind of knowledge which gives unity and system to the body of the sciences4, and the kind which results from a critical examination of the grounds of our convictions, prejudices, and beliefs. But it cannot be maintained that philosophy has had any very great measure of success in its attempts to provide definite answers to its questions. If you ask a mathematician, a mineralogist, a historian, or any other man of learning, what definite body of truths has been ascertained by his science, his answer will last as long as you are willing to listen. But if you put the same question to a philosopher, he will, if he is candid, have to confess that his study has not achieved positive results such as have been achieved by other sciences. It is true that this is partly accounted for by the fact that, as soon as definite knowledge concerning any subject becomes possible, this subject ceases to be called philosophy, and becomes a separate science. The whole study of the heavens, which now belongs to astronomy, was once included in philosophy; Newton’s great work was called “the mathematical principles of natural philosophy”. Similarly, the study of the human mind, which was a part of philosophy, has now been separated from philosophy and has become the science of psychology. Thus, to a great extent, the uncertainty of philosophy is more apparent than real: those questions which are already capable of definite answers are placed in the sciences, while those only to which, at present, no definite answer can be given, remain to form the residue which is called philosophy.

[5] This is, however, only a part of the truth concerning the uncertainty of philosophy. There are many questions — and among them those that are of the profoundest interest to our spiritual life — which, so far as we can see, must remain insoluble to the human intellect unless its powers become of quite a different order5 from what they are now. Has the universe any unity of plan or purpose, or is it a fortuitous concourse of atoms? Is consciousness a permanent part of the universe, giving hope of indefinite growth in wisdom, or is it a transitory accident on a small planet on which life must ultimately become impossible? Are good and evil of importance to the universe or only to man? Such questions are asked by philosophy, and variously answered by various philosophers. But it would seem that, whether answers be otherwise discoverable or not, the answers suggested by philosophy are none of them demonstrably true. Yet, however slight may be the hope of discovering an answer, it is part of the business of philosophy to continue the consideration of such questions, to make us aware of their importance, to examine all the approaches to them, and to keep alive that speculative interest in the universe which is apt to be killed by confining ourselves to definitely ascertainable knowledge.

[6] The value of philosophy is, in fact, to be sought largely in its very uncertainty. The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which have grown up in his mind without the cooperation or consent of his deliberate reason. To such a man the world tends to become definite, finite, obvious; common objects rouse no questions, and unfamiliar possibilities are contemptuously rejected. As soon as we begin to philosophize, on the contrary, we find, as we saw in our opening chapters, that even the most everyday things lead to problems to which only very incomplete answers can be given. Philosophy, though unable to tell us with certainty what is the true answer to the doubts which it raises, is able to suggest many possibilities which enlarge our thoughts and free them from the tyranny of custom. Thus, while diminishing our feeling of certainty as to what things are, it greatly increases our knowledge as to what they may be; it removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have never travelled into the region of liberating doubt, and it keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect.

[7] Apart from its utility in showing unsuspected possibilities, philosophy has a value — perhaps its chief value — through the greatness of the objects which it contemplates, and the freedom from narrow and personal aims resulting from this contemplation. The life of the instinctive man is shut up within the circle of his private interests: family and friends may be included, but the outer world is not regarded except as it may help or hinder what comes within the circle of instinctive wishes. In such a life there is something feverish and confined6, in comparison with the philosophic life which is calm and free. The private world of instinctive interests is a small one, set in the midst of a great and powerful world which must, sooner or later, lay our private world in ruins7. Unless we can so enlarge our interests as to include the whole outer world, we remain like a garrison in a beleaguered fortress, knowing that the enemy prevents escape and that ultimate surrender is inevitable. In such a life there is no peace, but a constant strife between the insistence of desire and the powerlessness of will. In one way or another, if our life is to be great and free, we must escape this prison and this strife.

[8] One way of escape is by philosophic contemplation. Philosophic contemplation does not, in its widest survey, divide the universe into two hostile camps — friends and foes, helpful and hostile, good and bad — it views the whole impartially. Philosophic contemplation, when it is unalloyed8, does not aim at proving that the rest of the universe is akin to man. All acquisition of knowledge is an enlargement of the Self, but this enlargement is best attained when it is not directly sought. It is obtained when the desire for knowledge is alone operative, by a study which does not wish in advance that its objects should have this or that character, but adapts the Self to the characters which it finds in its objects. This enlargement of Self is not obtained when, taking the Self as it is, we try to show that the world is so similar to this Self that knowledge of it is possible without any admission of what seems alien. The desire to prove this is a form of selfassertion and, like all self-assertion, it is an obstacle to the growth of Self which it desires, and of which the Self knows that it is capable. Self-assertion, in philosophic speculation as elsewhere, views the world as a means to its own ends; thus it makes the world of less account than Self, and the Self sets bounds to the greatness of its goods. In contemplation, on the contrary, we start from the not-Self, and through its greatness the boundaries of Self are enlarged; through the infinity of the universe the mind which contemplates it achieves some share in infinity.

[9] For this reason greatness of soul is not fostered by those philosophies which assimilate the universe to Man. Knowledge is a form of union of Self and not-Self; like all union, it is impaired by dominion, and therefore by any attempt to force the universe into conformity with what we find in ourselves. There is a widespread philosophical tendency towards the view which tells us that Man is the measure of all things, that truth is man-made, that space and time and the world of universals are properties of the mind, and that, if there be anything not created by the mind, it is unknowable and of no account for us. This view, if our previous discussions were correct, is untrue; but in addition to being untrue, it has the effect of robbing philosophic contemplation of all that gives it value, since it fetters contemplation to Self. What it calls knowledge is not a union with the not-Self, but a set of prejudices, habits, and desires, making an impenetrable veil between us and the world beyond. The man who finds pleasure in such a theory of knowledge is like the man who never leaves the domestic circle for fear his word might not be law.

[10] The true philosophic contemplation, on the contrary, finds its satisfaction in every enlargement of the not-Self, in everything that magnifies the objects9 contemplated, and thereby the subject10 contemplating. Everything, in contemplation, that is personal or private, everything that depends upon habit, self-interest, or desire, distorts the object, and hence impairs the union which the intellect seeks. By thus making a barrier between subject and object, such personal and private things become a prison to the intellect. The free intellect will see as God might see, without a here and now, without hopes and fears, without the trammels of customary beliefs and traditional prejudices, calmly, dispassionately, in the sole and exclusive desire of knowledge — knowledge as impersonal, as purely contemplative, as it is possible for man to attain. Hence also the free intellect will value more the abstract and universal knowledge into which the accidents of private history do not enter, than the knowledge brought by the senses, and dependent, as such knowledge must be, upon an exclusive and personal point of view and a body whose sense-organs distort as much as they reveal.

[11] The mind which has become accustomed to the freedom and impartiality of philosophic contemplation will preserve something of the same freedom and impartiality in the world of action and emotion. It will view its purposes and desires as parts of the whole, with the absence of insistence that results from seeing them as infinitesimal fragments in a world of which all the rest is unaffected by any one man’s deeds. The impartiality which, in contemplation, is the unalloyed desire for truth, is the very same quality of mind which, in action, is justice, and in emotion is that universal love which can be given to all, and not only to those who are judged useful or admirable. Thus contemplation enlarges not only the objects of our thoughts, but also the objects of our actions and our affections: it makes us citizens of the universe, not only of one walled city at war with all the rest. In this citizenship of the universe consists man’s true freedom, and his liberation from the thralldom of narrow hopes and fears.

[12] Thus, to sum up our discussion of the value of philosophy; Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good.

Notes

1.in view of: considering, because of 考虑到，鉴于

2.matters concerning which knowledge is impossible: matters beyond our capability of knowing知识和理解所不能及的问题

3.goods: 此处指（哲学努力想要达到的）目标

4.the body of the sciences: the collection of sciences 全体科学的集合

5.a different order: 另一个（更高的）数量级

6.feverish and confined: 狂热和狭隘

7.lay our private world in ruins: ruin our private world

8.unalloyed: free from admixture, uncontaminated 不掺杂的，纯粹的

9.objects: things or matters being contemplated by the mind（被冥想的）客体

10.subject: the mind or intellect contemplating （进行冥想的）主体

Questions for Further Thinking

1.How can you define the relationship between philosophy and other sciences?

2.Why does the author say “the uncertainty of philosophy is more apparent than real”(Paragraph 4)?

3.Can mankind ever find the solution to the questions that are of the most profound interest to human spiritual life? If there is only the slightest hope of discovering an answer, why is it still of importance to continue to study them?

4.For an ordinary person, do you think it would be fine to go through life “imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which have grown up in his mind without the cooperation or consent of his deliberate reason”? Why or why not?

5.How can a person live a philosophic life which is calm and free?

6.Can you give examples in our society to show that private interests shut up man within the circle of his own instinctive wishes, thus leading to a feverish and confined life?

7.If a man views the world as a means to his own ends and makes the world of less account than Self, what will his life be like?

8.How do you understand “true philosophic contemplation” as Russell describes it? Do you think it makes sense to the average human being? Why or why not?

9.Is it true that “the thralldom of narrow hopes and fears” results from the absence of philosophic contemplation?

After-reading Assignment

Oral Work

1.Work with your partner(s) and summarize the author’s ideas about the value of philosophy. Share your summary with your classmates in a 3-minute presentation.

2.In spite of the constant struggle and strife of life, man aspires to escape into peace, calmness and freedom. Apart from philosophic contemplation, what other activities can provide such escape? Research into this question and share your findings with your classmates in a group discussion.

3.What lesson have you learned from the value of philosophy concerning the improvement of the quality of your life? Tell your classmate about a situation in life where the study of philosophy has an effect.

4.Russell has been quite friendly and sympathetic towards China and Chinese culture. As a philosopher, what is Russell’s attitude toward Confucianism? How does he interpret the philosophies of Lao-Tzu (老子) and Chuang-Tzu (庄子)? Study the connection between Russell, Confucius, Lao-Tzu and Chuang-Tzu, and then report your findings to your classmates in a 3-minute presentation.

Written Work

1.Write a 400-word summary of your discussion in Question 2 of Oral Work. Explain how some activities can free the mind from private interests and worldly concerns, and whether those activities are similar to philosophic contemplation.

2.High schools and universities in China all offer students courses in the direction of philosophy. What courses of philosophy have you learned? Does Russell reveal anything new or anything different from what you have learned about philosophy? Write a 300-word report about it.

3.In what ways can you relate philosophic contemplation to the present world characterized by data connection and data technology? Do some reading about philosophical consideration and methodological revolution in the big data era and put together a 200-word quotation containing the main ideas of what you read.

4.Create your own simile (明喻):

Simile is a figure of speech that expresses a direct comparison or resemblance between things (tenor and vehicle) through explicit use of “like”“as”“as if ”“resemble” etc.

For example,

... we remain like a garrison in a beleaguered fortress... (Paragraph 7)

The man who finds pleasure in such a theory of knowledge is like the man who never leaves the domestic circle for fear his word might not be law. (Paragraph 9)

Army and people are as inseparable as fish and water.

He is as obstinate as a mule.

Follow these examples and create 3 similes on your own. Try to be imaginative and unique. Then share your creation with your partner(s) and choose the ones you think most creative and effective.