一、国际社会制定多边投资规则的努力
《TRIMS协定》虽然是多边国际投资协定的最新成果，但由于其本身的局限性使其不能满足当今国际投资迅猛发展的要求，特别是一些发达国家对WTO现有与投资有关协定规定不满，普遍认为，只有制定一个全球性、综合性、具有普遍约束力的国际多边投资规则，才能符合当今世界经济一体化的趋势。为了实现这一目标，一些发达国家一直在进行多种努力。
1995年5月，经济合作与发展组织（OECD）在巴黎举行了有关《多边投资协定》（MAI）的谈判。其目标是“为国际投资提供一个广泛的、拥有高标准的投资制度自由化和投资保护，以及有效的争端解决程序的多边框架”，以促进经济增长，改善就业环境，使国际投资在平等条件下展开竞争。并且MAI是一个独立的国际条约，它对所有OECD成员方以及欧盟成员方开放，并允许非OECD成员方加入，这一点将随着谈判的进展予以磋商。MAI提出的核心原则包括透明度、国民待遇、最惠国待遇、资金转移、业绩要求、征用、争端处理等方面，考虑到每个国家的具体情况，还规定了一般例外、临时性保护措施、某一成员方特定的例外等条款，以照顾申请国的发展利益。协定的主要内容是，实现全面的贸易和投资自由。所有投资协定的参加国都必须将任何形式的国民财富无保留、无条件地向任何投资者开放，任何违反自由投资的立法将限期废除。
MAI在货物贸易、服务贸易、与贸易有关的投资措施和与贸易有关的知识产权方面与WTO在部分内容上是一致的。与《TRIMS协定》相似，MAI同样提出对将会限制贸易发展或产生贸易冲击的投资措施加以限制和规范，但它在涵盖的范围和约束的程度上要超过TRIMS（TRIMS仅对货物贸易加以约束）。MAI于1997年4月出台，由于种种原因于1998年宣告失败，而其中最主要的原因是OECD是富国的俱乐部，并且设定的标准过高，不能代表广大发展中国家的利益和要求，因而不具有普遍性。
与此同时，发达国家也没有放弃在WTO中进一步修改《TRIMS协定》，并在WTO框架下进一步发起多边投资谈判的努力，特别是在MAI失败后，这种努力显得更加重要。
实际上，早在WTO成立后的1996年12月在新加坡举行的第一届部长级会议上，经过协商，就已经同意成立贸易与投资、贸易与竞争政策以及政府采购透明度3个工作组。WTO贸易与投资关系工作组严格基于新加坡部长宣言第20节的授权，只限于研讨贸易与投资的关系，其研讨限于WTO成员提出的与贸易和投资关系有关的议题，内容通常包括贸易与投资的关系、贸易投资与发展之间的关系、国际投资的作用、国际投资中政府干预的地位评估、国际投资中的技术转移的法律调控、投资鼓励的利弊分析、改进WTO框架下的多边投资规则问题、投资环境问题以及在WTO框架下制定新的多边投资协议的问题。但根据部长宣言的内容，工作组所从事的工作只具有研究探讨的性质，有关投资领域多边规则的谈判只有在WTO成员之间对这些谈判达成明确的一致决议的时候才能举行。
第四届WTO部长级会议于2001年11月在多哈召开，根据WTO《多哈部长宣言》，多边投资框架有助于建立一个透明、稳定和可预测的投资环境，推动国际直接投资的发展，从而促进全球贸易的增长。
关于贸易与投资的问题，《多哈部长宣言》第20条、第21条和第22条分别阐明了以下内容：
20. Recognizing the case for a multilateral framework to secure transparent, stable and predictable conditions for long-term cross-border investment, particularly foreign direct investment, that will contribute to the expansion of trade, and the need for enhanced technical assistance and capacity-building in this area as referred to in paragraph 21, we agree that negotiations will take place after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that Session on modalities of negotiations.
21. We recognize the needs of developing and least-developed countries for enhanced support for technical assistance and capacity building in this area, including policy analysis and development so that they may better evaluate the implications of closer multilateral cooperation for their development policies and objectives, and human and institutional development. To this end, we shall work in cooperation with other relevant intergovernmental organizations, including UNCTAD, and through appropriate regional and bilateral channels, to provide strengthened and adequately resourced assistance to respond to these needs.
22. In the period until the Fifth Session, further work in the Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment will focus on the clarification of: scope and definition; transparency; non-discrimination; modalities for pre-establishment commitments based on a GATS-type, positive list approach; development provisions; exceptions and balance-of-payments safeguards; consultation and the settlement of disputes between Members. Any framework should reflect in a balanced manner the interests of home and host countries, and take due account of the development policies and objectives of host governments as well as their right to regulate in the public interest. The special development, trade and financial needs of developing and least-developed countries should be taken into account as an integral part of any framework, which should enable Members to undertake obligations and commitments commensurate with their individual needs and circumstances. Due regard should be paid to other relevant WTO provisions. Account should be taken, as appropriate, of existing bilateral and regional arrangements on investment.
多哈会议在2001年11月14日还达成了一项与执行有关的决议，其中第6条就《与贸易有关的投资措施协定》的执行问题作出如下处理：（1）将货物贸易委员会考虑到一些发展中国家成员要求延长5年过渡期（根据TRIMS5.2条）的要求而采取的行动记录在案。（2）强烈要求货物贸易委员会明确考虑那些在TRIMS5.3条款或WTOIX.3条款下的最不发达国家的要求以及考虑最不发达国家在制定包括时间框架在内的期限和条件时的特殊情况。
在此后的坎昆部长级会议上，与发展中国家切身利益密切相关的“新加坡议题”[1]成为发达国家和发展中国家争论的焦点。2004年8月1日成员方同意仅就“贸易便利化”议题进行谈判，而包括“贸易与投资”在内的三个议题从多哈议程中剔除，有关多边投资框架的谈判最终没能启动。[2]
二、国际社会难以达成多边投资规则的困难
迄今为止，国际社会就达成多边投资规则所作的努力均以失败而告终，认真分析不难发现，其困难主要来自以下方面。
（一）发达国家和发展中国家发展不平衡
发达国家与发展中国家经济发展不平衡是不争的事实。由于在国际投资领域中，发达国家和发展中国家所扮演的角色不完全一致，比如，发达国家主要是资本输出国，发展中国家主要是资本输入国，不同的角色决定了各方关注的重点不同。而统一的多边投资规则必须能够平衡发达国家和发展中国家各方的利益才能达成，否则连产生和存在的基础都没有。
（二）缺少一个普遍认可的谈判场所
MAI的失败已经证明OECD并不是一个作为制定多边投资协议的最适合的场所，至今难以启动的WTO下有关多边投资框架的谈判，也在很大程度上是由于很多成员方质疑WTO能否成为一个最佳的场所。在是否支持在WTO体系内进行多边投资规则谈判的问题上，不能以发达国家和发展中国家作为界限来加以简单区分，实际情况是发达国家和发展中国家都有反对者和支持者。不仅如此，一些非政府组织也强烈反对在WTO框架下进行有关多边投资规则的谈判。反对者根据自己的出发点，罗列出各种理由，比如WTO不是一个透明和民主的机构、WTO在本质上只是一个贸易组织等，无论这些理由能否成立，都在实际上起到了阻止在WTO框架下制定多边投资规则步伐的作用。
（三）内容复杂，难以统一
结合OECD的MAI和WTO多边投资框架，可以发现多边投资规则所涉及的都是国际投资的重要问题，包括投资的定义、国民待遇、投资鼓励和履行要求、投资保护、争端解决等。而不同国家有不同的法律传统，涉及的内容也不相同，发达国家强调的重点是高标准的投资自由化、投资保护和投资争端解决三者紧密结合的内容，而发展中国家强调的重点则是如何通过协议保护本国的利益不受侵害，这就决定了国际投资规则内容的复杂性。在不同国家有关国际投资的立法理念和坚持的内容难以协调的情况下，统一国际投资立法的目的很难实现。
三、《TRIMS协定》展望
随着经济全球化步伐的加快，国际直接投资日益显示出对国际经济发展的重要作用。《TRIMS协定》作为这一进程中所取得的重要成果，对国际直接投资的调整作用毋庸置疑。随着贸易自由化的发展，投资自由化也已成为一种发展趋势，客观上需要制定一个统一的多边投资规范已基本成为各国的共识。《TRIMS协定》的成果对于制定多边投资规则的积极意义及其内容和作用的局限性无论从信心和必要性角度都促使国际社会去寻求不断加强该协定的作用。
尽管以《TRIMS协定》为基础统一国际投资规则存在很大的困难，一方面，一些发达国家由于利益的驱动是不会放弃这一努力的；另一方面，一些发展中国家由于承受的压力太大，或者考虑通过某种让步换取其他方面更为迫切的需要也会接受这种现实，并随着自身实力的不断强大而由被动转为主动，积极加入统一国际投资规则的努力之中，在参与中寻求自身利益的最大化。
综上所述，《TRIMS协定》的发展趋势将是：在渐进中使自身不断得到完善，但在WTO这样的贸易组织中，仅从贸易与投资关系的角度使其转变成为真正意义上的多边投资规则的前景并不乐观。
Case Study：
CHINA-MEASURES AFFECTING IMPORTS OF
AUTOMOBILE PARTS-REPORTS OF THE PANEL
Symbol :WT/DS339/R, WT/DS340/R, WT/DS342/R
Date: 18/07/2008
Complaints: the European communities, the United states and Canada
Respondent:China
Background and Facts
· Complaints of the european communities, the united states and canada
On 30 March 2006, the European Communities and the United States requested consultations with the People's Republic of China （hereinafter “China”） pursuant to Article 4 of the DSU, Article ⅩⅫ:1 of the GATT 1994, Article 8 of the TRIMs Agreement and Articles 4 and 30 of the SCM Agreement regarding China's imposition of measures that allegedly adversely affect exports of automobile parts from the European Communities and the United States to China. On 13 April 2006, Canada requested consultations with China pursuant to Articles 1 and 4 of the DSU, Article ⅩⅫ of the GATT 1994, Article 7 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin （ARO）, Article 8 of the TRIMs Agreement, and Articles 4 and 30 of the SCM Agreement with respect to China's treatment of automobile parts from Canada.
Consultations were held between the European Communities, the United States, Canada and China on 11 and 12 May 2006 in Geneva on these and other measures. They did not lead to a satisfactory resolution of the matter.
On 15 September 2006, the European Communities, the United States and Canada each requested the establishment of a panel. At its meeting on 28 September 2006, the Dispute Settlement Body deferred the establishments of a panel. On 29 January 2007, the Director-General accordingly composed the Panel.
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Japan, Mexico, Chinese Taipei and Thailand have reserved their rights to participate in the Panel proceedings as third parties.
On 20 September 2007, the Panel issued the descriptive part of its Panel Report. The Panel submitted its Interim Reports to the parties on 13 February 2008. The Panel submitted its Final Reports to the parties on 20 March 2008.
· Measures at issue
This case concerns China's measures on imports of automobile parts. The European Communities, the United States and Canada have identified the following as the measures at issue in this case:
（a）Policy on Development of Automotive Industry （Order of the National Development and Reform Commission （No. 8）） （“Policy Order 8”）, which entered into force on 21 May 2004;
（b）Administrative Rules on Importation of Automobile Parts Characterized as Complete Vehicles （Decree of the People's Republic of China, No. 125） （“Decree 125”）, which entered into force on 1 April 2005; and
（c）Rules on Verification of Imported Automobile Parts Characterized as Complete Vehicles （Public Announcement of the Customs General Administration of the People's Republic of China, No. 4 of 2005） （“Announcement 4”）, which entered into force on 1 April 2005.
· Parties’ requests for findings and recommendations
A. We only select the European communities’requests.
The European Communities requests the Panel to find that China has acted inconsistently with:
（a）Article 2.1 and Article 2.2 of the TRIMs Agreement in conjunction with paragraph 1（a） of the Illustrative List annexed to the TRIMs Agreement by applying investment measures related to trade in goods that are inconsistent with the provisions of Article Ⅲ or Article Ⅺ of GATT 1994 and by applying investment measures related to trade in goods, compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local production. Further, China has acted inconsistently with Article 2.1 and 2.2 of the TRIMs Agreement in conjunction with paragraph 2（a） of the Illustrative List annexed to the TRIMs Agreement, by applying investment measures related to trade in goods that are inconsistent with the provisions of Article Ⅲ or Article Ⅺ of GATT 1994 and by applying investment measures related to trade in goods, compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which restricts the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production, generally or to an amount related to the volume or value of local production that it exports;
（b） its obligations under the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, as set out in the Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China to the WTO, in particular Part I paragraph 7.3 of the Protocol of Accession of China, and in paragraph 203 of the Working Party Report on the Accession of China in conjunction with Part I, paragraph 1.2 of the Protocol of Accession of China, and paragraph 342 of the Working Party Report on the Accession of China by failing, upon accession, to comply fully with the TRIMs Agreement, without recourse to Article 5 thereof, and to eliminate local content requirements and to not enforce the terms of contracts containing such requirements;
（c） Article Ⅲ:4 of the GATT 1994 by imposing specified thresholds for imported parts in an assembled vehicle above which an additional charge applies on each imported part included in the vehicle. In addition, as part of the measures, China also imposes additional administrative requirements on importers and manufacturers that may not meet the required threshold for domestic content. Thereby, China has failed to accord, to products of the territory of the European Communities imported into the territory of China, treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use;
（d） Article Ⅲ:2 of the GATT 1994 by subjecting the products of the territory of other Members imported into the territory of China, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. China has also applied internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1 of Article Ⅲ;
…
B. China
China requests that:
（a）the Panel reject the claims raised by the European Communities, the United States, and Canada; and…
（b）in the event that the Panel finds that one or more aspects of the challenged measures is inconsistent with Article Ⅱ or Article Ⅲ of the GATT, China has provisionally demonstrated that any inconsistency between the challenged measures and China's GATT obligations is subject to the general exception under Article ⅩⅩ（d）. conclusions and recommendations
1.…
A.Complaint by the european communities （DS339）: conclusions and recommendations of the panel
（a）With respect to imported auto parts in general, the Panel concludes:
（i）Policy Order 8, Decree 125 and Announcement 4 are inconsistent with Article Ⅲ:2, first sentence of the GATT 1994 in that they subject imported auto parts to an internal charge in excess of that applied to like domestic auto parts;
（ii）Policy Order 8, Decree 125 and Announcement 4 are inconsistent with Article Ⅲ:4 of the GATT 1994 in that they accord imported auto parts less favourable treatment than like domestic auto parts; and
（iii）Policy Order 8, Decree 125 and Announcement 4 are not justified under Article ⅩⅩ（d） of the GATT 1994 as measures that are necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the GATT 1994.
（b）In the alternative, assuming that the measures fall within the scope of the first sentence of Article Ⅱ:1（b） of the GATT 1994, with respect to imported auto parts in general, the Panel concludes:
（i）Policy Order 8, Decree 125 and Announcement 4 are inconsistent with Article Ⅱ:1（a） and Article Ⅱ:1（b）, first sentence of the GATT 1994 in that they accord imported auto parts treatment less favourable than that provided for in the appropriate Part of China's Schedule of Concessions; and
（ii）Policy Order 8, Decree 125 and Announcement 4 are not justified under Article ⅩⅩ（d） of the GATT 1994 as measures that are necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the GATT 1994.
（c）with respect to CKD （Completely Knocked Down） and SKD（Semi-Knocked Down） kits, the Panel concludes:
（i）Policy Order 8, Decree 125 and Announcement 4 are not inconsistent with Article Ⅱ:1（b） of the GATT 1994.
2. With respect to the European Communities’ claims that Policy Order 8, Decree 125 and Announcement 4 are inconsistent with the TRIMs Agreement and Article Ⅲ:5 of the GATT 1994, the Panel has decided to exercise judicial economy.
3. Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment. The Panel concludes that, to the extent that the measures listed above are inconsistent with the GATT 1994, they have nullified or impaired benefits accruing to the European Communities under those agreements.
4. Accordingly, the Panel recommends that the Dispute Settlement Body request China to bring these inconsistent measures as listed above into conformity with its obligations under the GATT 1994.
…
10. Accordingly, the Panel recommends that the Dispute Settlement Body request China to bring these inconsistent measures as listed above into conformity with its obligations under the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement.
Questions:
1. What are the main points of the Panel's conclusions?
2. Do you think the measures at issue are inconsistent with Article 2 of TRIMs Agreement?
3. What should China learn from this case?
【复习思考题】
1.TRIMS有哪些？
2.《TRIMS协定》与GATT之间的关系。
3.《TRIMS协定》对中国外资立法的影响。
4.《TRIMS协定》的发展趋势。
[1] 即贸易与投资、竞争政策、政府采购透明度和贸易便利化四个议题。
[2] WTO:Investment, competition, procurement, simpler procedures，http://www.WTO.org/english/theWTO_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey3_e.htm，2012年2月25日访问。