（三）措施是否构成对国际贸易的变相限制

在“美国精炼汽油和传统汽油标准案”中，上诉机构认为，“对国际贸易的变相限制”需要与“武断或不正当的歧视”结合起来理解：‘Arbitrary discrimination’, ‘unjustifiable discrimination’ and ‘disguised restriction’ on international trade may, accordingly, be read side-by-side; they impart meaning to one another. It is clear to us that ‘disguised restriction’ includes disguised discrimination in international trade. It is equally clear that concealed or unannounced restriction or discrimination in international trade does not exhaust the meaning of ‘disguised restriction.’ We consider that ‘disguised restriction’, whatever else it covers, may properly be read as embracing restrictions amounting to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in international trade taken under the guise of a measure formally within the terms of an exception listed in Article ⅩⅩ. Put in a somewhat different manner, the kinds of considerations pertinent in deciding whether the application of a particular measure amounts to ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’, may also be taken into account in determining the presence of a ‘disguised restriction’ on international trade. The fundamental theme is to be found in the purpose and object of avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of the exceptions to substantive rules available in Article ⅩⅩ.[12]

综上所述，根据WTO专家组和上诉机构的解释，第20条在实践中的适用应该分两步走：第一步确定具体措施是否符合本条（a）到（j）项的要求，如果符合，则进行第二个步骤——确定具体措施是否符合第20条前言的附加条件。由此可见，成员方想要通过援引第20条来免除所采取的措施与WTO协议不符的责任是十分困难的，这一点在WTO争端解决机制实践中也有着充分地反映。

Case Study

UNITED STATES - IMPORT PROHIBITION OF CERTAIN

SHRIMP AND SHRIMP PRODUCTS

WT/DS58/AB/R

The basic facts of the case have been introduced in the pretext. Here are the selected awards of the Appellate Body:

150.We commence the second tier of our analysis with an examination of the ordinary meaning of the words of the chapeau. The precise language of the chapeau requires that a measure not be applied in a manner which would constitute a means of “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail” or a “disguised restriction on international trade.” There are three standards contained in the chapeau: first, arbitrary discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail; second, unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail; and third, a disguised restriction on international trade. In order for a measure to be applied in a manner which would constitute “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail”, three elements must exist. First, the application of the measure must result in discrimination. As we stated in United States - Gasoline, the nature and quality of this discrimination is different from the discrimination in the treatment of products which was already found to be inconsistent with one of the substantive obligations of the GATT 1994, such as Articles Ⅰ, Ⅲ or Ⅺ. Second, the discrimination must be arbitrary or unjustifiable in character. We will examine this element of arbitrariness or unjustifiability in detail below. Third, this discrimination must occur between countries where the same conditions prevail. In United States - Gasoline, we accepted the assumption of the participants in that appeal that such discrimination could occur not only between different exporting Members, but also between exporting Members and the importing Member concerned. Thus, the standards embodied in the language of the chapeau are not only different from the requirements of Article ⅩⅩ（g）; they are also different from the standard used in determining that Section 609 is violative of the substantive rules of Article Ⅺ:1 of the GATT 1994.

…

156.Turning then to the chapeau of Article ⅩⅩ, we consider that it embodies the recognition on the part of WTO Members of the need to maintain a balance of rights and obligations between the right of a Member to invoke one or another of the exceptions of Article ⅩⅩ, specified in paragraphs （a） to （j）, on the one hand, and the substantive rights of the other Members under the GATT 1994, on the other hand. Exercise by one Member of its right to invoke an exception, such as Article ⅩⅩ（g）, if abused or misused, will, to that extent, erode or render naught the substantive treaty rights in, for example, Article Ⅺ:1, of other Members. Similarly, because the GATT 1994 itself makes available the exceptions of Article ⅩⅩ, in recognition of the legitimate nature of the policies and interests there embodied, the right to invoke one of those exceptions is not to be rendered illusory. The same concept may be expressed from a slightly different angle of vision, thus, a balance must be struck between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article ⅩⅩ and the duty of that same Member to respect the treaty rights of the other Members. To permit one Member to abuse or misuse its right to invoke an exception would be effectively to allow that Member to degrade its own treaty obligations as well as to devalue the treaty rights of other Members. If the abuse or misuse is sufficiently grave or extensive, the Member, in effect, reduces its treaty obligation to a merely facultative one and dissolves its juridical character, and, in so doing, negates altogether the treaty rights of other Members. The chapeau was installed at the head of the list of “General Exceptions” in Article ⅩⅩ to prevent such far-reaching consequences.

157.In our view, the language of the chapeau makes clear that each of the exceptions in paragraphs （a） to （j） of Article ⅩⅩ is a limited and conditional exception from the substantive obligations contained in the other provisions of the GATT 1994, that is to say, the ultimate availability of the exception is subject to the compliance by the invoking Member with the requirements of the chapeau. This interpretation of the chapeau is confirmed by its negotiating history. The language initially proposed by the United States in 1946 for the chapeau of what would later become Article ⅩⅩ was unqualified and unconditional. Several proposals were made during the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment in 1946 suggesting modifications. In November 1946, the United Kingdom proposed that “in order to prevent abuse of the exceptions of Article 32 \[which would subsequently become Article ⅩⅩ\]”, the chapeau of this provision should be qualified. This proposal was generally accepted, subject to later review of its precise wording. Thus, the negotiating history of Article ⅩⅩ confirms that the paragraphs of Article ⅩⅩ set forth limited and conditional exceptions from the obligations of the substantive provisions of the GATT. Any measure, to qualify finally for exception, must also satisfy the requirements of the chapeau. This is a fundamental part of the balance of rights and obligations struck by the original framers of the GATT 1947.

158.The chapeau of Article ⅩⅩ is, in fact, but one expression of the principle of good faith. This principle, at once a general principle of law and a general principle of international law, controls the exercise of rights by states. One application of this general principle, the application widely known as the doctrine of abus de droit, prohibits the abusive exercise of a state's rights and enjoins that whenever the assertion of a right “impinges on the field covered by \[a\] treaty obligation, it must be exercised bona fide, that is to say, reasonably.” An abusive exercise by a Member of its own treaty right thus results in a breach of the treaty rights of the other Members and, as well, a violation of the treaty obligation of the Member so acting. Having said this, our task here is to interpret the language of the chapeau, seeking additional interpretative guidance, as appropriate, from the general principles of international law.

159.The task of interpreting and applying the chapeau is, hence, essentially the delicate one of locating and marking out a line of equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article ⅩⅩ and the rights of the other Members under varying substantive provisions （e.g., Article Ⅺ） of the GATT 1994, so that neither of the competing rights will cancel out the other and thereby distort and nullify or impair the balance of rights and obligations constructed by the Members themselves in that Agreement. The location of the line of equilibrium, as expressed in the chapeau, is not fixed and unchanging; the line moves as the kind and the shape of the measures at stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases differ.

160.With these general considerations in mind, we address now the issue of whether the application of the United States measure, although the measure itself falls within the terms of Article ⅩⅩ（g）, nevertheless constitutes “a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail” or “a disguised restriction on international trade”. We address, in other words, whether the application of this measure constitutes an abuse or misuse of the provisional justification made available by Article ⅩⅩ（g）. We note, preliminarily, that the application of a measure may be characterized as amounting to an abuse or misuse of an exception of Article ⅩⅩ not only when the detailed operating provisions of the measure prescribe the arbitrary or unjustifiable activity, but also where a measure, otherwise fair and just on its face, is actually applied in an arbitrary or unjustifiable manner. The standards of the chapeau, in our view, project both substantive and procedural requirements.

161.We scrutinize first whether Section 609 has been applied in a manner constituting “unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail”. Perhaps the most conspicuous flaw in this measure's application relates to its intended and actual coercive effect on the specific policy decisions made by foreign governments, Members of the WTO. Section 609, in its application, is, in effect, an economic embargo which requires all other exporting Members, if they wish to exercise their GATT rights, to adopt essentially the same policy （together with an approved enforcement program） as that applied to, and enforced on, United States domestic shrimp trawlers. As enacted by the Congress of the United States, the statutory provisions of Section 609（b）（2）（A） and （B） do not, in themselves, require that other WTO Members adopt essentially the same policies and enforcement practices as the United States. Viewed alone, the statute appears to permit a degree of discretion or flexibility in how the standards for determining comparability might be applied, in practice, to other countries. However, any flexibility that may have been intended by Congress when it enacted the statutory provision has been effectively eliminated in the implementation of that policy through the 1996 Guidelines promulgated by the Department of State and through the practice of the administrators in making certification determinations.

162.According to the 1996 Guidelines, certification “shall be made” under Section 609（b）（2）（A） and （B） if an exporting country's program includes a requirement that all commercial shrimp trawl vessels operating in waters in which there is a likelihood of intercepting sea turtles use, at all times, TEDs comparable in effectiveness to those used in the United States. Under these Guidelines, any exceptions to the requirement of the use of TEDs must be comparable to those of the United States program. Furthermore, the harvesting country must have in place a “credible enforcement effort”. The language in the 1996 Guidelines is mandatory: certification “shall be made” if these conditions are fulfilled. However, we understand that these rules are also applied in an exclusive manner. That is, the 1996 Guidelines specify the only way that a harvesting country's regulatory program can be deemed “comparable” to the United States’ program, and, therefore, they define the only way that a harvesting nation can be certified under Section 609（b）（2）（A） and （B）. Although the 1996 Guidelines state that, in making a comparability determination, the Department of State “shall also take into account other measures the harvesting nation undertakes to protect sea turtles”, in practice, the competent government officials only look to see whether there is a regulatory program requiring the use of TEDs or one that comes within one of the extremely limited exceptions available to United States shrimp trawl vessels.

163.The actual application of the measure, through the implementation of the 1996 Guidelines and the regulatory practice of administrators, requires other WTO Members to adopt a regulatory program that is not merely comparable, but rather essentially the same, as that applied to the United States shrimp trawl vessels. Thus, the effect of the application of Section 609 is to establish a rigid and unbending standard by which United States officials determine whether or not countries will be certified, thus granting or refusing other countries the right to export shrimp to the United States. Other specific policies and measures that an exporting country may have adopted for the protection and conservation of sea turtles are not taken into account, in practice, by the administrators making the comparability determination.

164.We understand that the United States also applies a uniform standard throughout its territory, regardless of the particular conditions existing in certain parts of the country. The United States requires the use of approved TEDs at all times by domestic, commercial shrimp trawl vessels operating in waters where there is any likelihood that they may interact with sea turtles, regardless of the actual incidence of sea turtles in those waters, the species of those sea turtles, or other differences or disparities that may exist in different parts of the United States. It may be quite acceptable for a government, in adopting and implementing a domestic policy, to adopt a single standard applicable to all its citizens throughout that country. However, it is not acceptable, in international trade relations, for one WTO Member to use an economic embargo to require other Members to adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory program, to achieve a certain policy goal, as that in force within that Member's territory, without taking into consideration different conditions which may occur in the territories of those other Members.

165.Furthermore, when this dispute was before the Panel and before us, the United States did not permit imports of shrimp harvested by commercial shrimp trawl vessels using TEDs comparable in effectiveness to those required in the United States if those shrimp originated in waters of countries not certified under Section 609. In other words, shrimp caught using methods identical to those employed in the United States have been excluded from the United States market solely because they have been caught in waters of countries that have not been certified by the United States. The resulting situation is difficult to reconcile with the declared policy objective of protecting and conserving sea turtles. This suggests to us that this measure, in its application, is more concerned with effectively influencing WTO Members to adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory regime as that applied by the United States to its domestic shrimp trawlers, even though many of those Members may be differently situated. We believe that discrimination results not only when countries in which the same conditions prevail are differently treated, but also when the application of the measure at issue does not allow for any inquiry into the appropriateness of the regulatory program for the conditions prevailing in those exporting countries.

166.Another aspect of the application of Section 609 that bears heavily in any appraisal of justifiable or unjustifiable discrimination is the failure of the United States to engage the appellees, as well as other Members exporting shrimp to the United States, in serious, across-the-board negotiations with the objective of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection and conservation of sea turtles, before enforcing the import prohibition against the shrimp exports of those other Members. The relevant factual finding of the Panel reads:

… However, we have no evidence that the United States actually undertook negotiations on an agreement on sea turtle conservation techniques which would have included the complainants before the imposition of the import ban as a result of the CIT judgement. From the replies of the parties to our question on this subject, in particular that of the United States, we understand that the United States did not propose the negotiation of an agreement to any of the complainants until after the conclusion of negotiations on the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, in September 1996, i.e. well after the deadline for the imposition of the import ban of 1 May 1996. Even then, it seems that the efforts made merely consisted of an exchange of documents. We therefore conclude that, in spite of the possibility offered by its legislation, the United States did not enter into negotiations before it imposed the import ban. As we consider that the measures sought by the United States were of the type that would normally require international cooperation, we do not find it necessary to examine whether parties entered into negotiations in good faith and whether the United States, absent any result, would have been entitled to adopt unilateral measures. （emphasis added）

167.A propos this failure to have prior consistent recourse to diplomacy as an instrument of environmental protection policy, which produces discriminatory impacts on countries exporting shrimp to the United States with which no international agreements are reached or even seriously attempted, a number of points must be made. First, the Congress of the United States expressly recognized the importance of securing international agreements for the protection and conservation of the sea turtle species in enacting this law. Section 609（a） directs the Secretary of State to:

（1）initiate negotiations as soon as possible for the development of bilateral or multilateral agreements with other nations for the protection and conservation of such species of sea turtles;

（2）initiate negotiations as soon as possible with all foreign governments which are engaged in, or which have persons or companies engaged in, commercial fishing operations which, as determined by the Secretary of Commerce, may affect adversely such species of sea turtles, for the purpose of entering into bilateral and multilateral treaties with such countries to protect such species of sea turtles;

…

Apart from the negotiation of the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles （the “Inter-American Convention”） which concluded in 1996, the record before the Panel does not indicate any serious, substantial efforts to carry out these express directions of Congress.

168.Second, the protection and conservation of highly migratory species of sea turtles, that is, the very policy objective of the measure, demands concerted and cooperative efforts on the part of the many countries whose waters are traversed in the course of recurrent sea turtle migrations. The need for, and the appropriateness of, such efforts have been recognized in the WTO itself as well as in a significant number of other international instruments and declarations. As stated earlier, the Decision on Trade and Environment, which provided for the establishment of the CTE and set out its terms of reference, refers to both the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and Agenda 21. Of particular relevance is Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which states, in part:

Unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided.Environmental measures addressing transboundary or global environmental problems should, as far as possible, be based on international consensus.（emphasis added）

169.Third, the United States did negotiate and conclude one regional international agreement for the protection and conservation of sea turtles: The Inter-American Convention. This Convention was opened for signature on 1 December 1996 and has been signed by five countries, in addition to the United States, and four of these countries are currently certified under Section 609. This Convention has not yet been ratified by any of its signatories. The Inter-American Convention provides that each party shall take “appropriate and necessary measures” for the protection, conservation and recovery of sea turtle populations and their habitats within such party's land territory and in maritime areas with respect to which it exercises sovereign rights or jurisdiction. Such measures include, notably, the reduction, to the greatest extent practicable, of the incidental capture, retention, harm or mortality of sea turtles in the course of fishing activities, through the appropriate regulation of such activities, as well as the development, improvement and use of appropriate gear, devices or techniques, including the use of turtle excluder devices （TEDs） pursuant to the provisions of Annex Ⅲ \[of the Convention\].

Article ⅩⅤ of the Inter-American Convention also provides, in part:

Article ⅩⅤ

Trade Measures

1.In implementing this Convention, the Parties shall act in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization （WTO）, as adopted at Marrakesh in 1994, including its annexes.

2.In particular, and with respect to the subject-matter of this Convention, the Parties shall act in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade contained in Annex 1 of the WTO Agreement, as well as Article Ⅺ of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994. …（emphasis added）

170.The juxtaposition of （a） the consensual undertakings to put in place regulations providing for, inter alia, use of TEDs jointly determined to be suitable for a particular party's maritime areas, with （b） the reaffirmation of the parties’ obligations under the WTO Agreement, including the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and Article Ⅺ of the GATT 1994, suggests that the parties to the Inter-American Convention together marked out the equilibrium line to which we referred earlier. The Inter-American Convention demonstrates the conviction of its signatories, including the United States, that consensual and multilateral procedures are available and feasible for the establishment of programs for the conservation of sea turtles. Moreover, the Inter-American Convention emphasizes the continuing validity and significance of Article Ⅺ of the GATT 1994, and of the obligations of the WTO Agreement generally, in maintaining the balance of rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement among the signatories of that Convention.

171.The Inter-American Convention thus provides convincing demonstration that an alternative course of action was reasonably open to the United States for securing the legitimate policy goal of its measure, a course of action other than the unilateral and non-consensual procedures of the import prohibition under Section 609. It is relevant to observe that an import prohibition is, ordinarily, the heaviest “weapon” in a Member's armory of trade measures. The record does not, however, show that serious efforts were made by the United States to negotiate similar agreements with any other country or group of countries before （and, as far as the record shows, after） Section 609 was enforced on a world-wide basis on 1 May 1996. Finally, the record also does not show that the appellant, the United States, attempted to have recourse to such international mechanisms as exist to achieve cooperative efforts to protect and conserve sea turtles before imposing the import ban.

172.Clearly, the United States negotiated seriously with some, but not with other Members （including the appellees）, that export shrimp to the United States. The effect is plainly discriminatory and, in our view, unjustifiable. The unjustifiable nature of this discrimination emerges clearly when we consider the cumulative effects of the failure of the United States to pursue negotiations for establishing consensual means of protection and conservation of the living marine resources here involved, notwithstanding the explicit statutory direction in Section 609 itself to initiate negotiations as soon as possible for the development of bilateral and multilateral agreements. The principal consequence of this failure may be seen in the resulting unilateralism evident in the application of Section 609. As we have emphasized earlier, the policies relating to the necessity for use of particular kinds of TEDs in various maritime areas, and the operating details of these policies, are all shaped by the Department of State, without the participation of the exporting Members. The system and processes of certification are established and administered by the United States agencies alone. The decision-making involved in the grant, denial or withdrawal of certification to the exporting Members, is, accordingly, also unilateral. The unilateral character of the application of Section 609 heightens the disruptive and discriminatory influence of the import prohibition and underscores its unjustifiability.

173.The application of Section 609, through the implementing guidelines together with administrative practice, also resulted in other differential treatment among various countries desiring certification. Under the 1991 and 1993 Guidelines, to be certifiable, fourteen countries in the wider Caribbean/western Atlantic region had to commit themselves to require the use of TEDs on all commercial shrimp trawling vessels by 1 May 1994. These fourteen countries had a “phase-in” period of three years during which their respective shrimp trawling sectors could adjust to the requirement of the use of TEDs. With respect to all other countries exporting shrimp to the United States （including the appellees, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand）, on 29 December 1995, the United States Court of International Trade directed the Department of State to apply the import ban on a world-wide basis not later than 1 May 1996. On 19 April 1996, the 1996 Guidelines were issued by the Department of State bringing shrimp harvested in all foreign countries within the scope of Section 609, effective 1 May 1996. Thus, all countries that were not among the fourteen in the wider Caribbean/western Atlantic region had only four months to implement the requirement of compulsory use of TEDs. We acknowledge that the greatly differing periods for putting into operation the requirement for use of TEDs resulted from decisions of the Court of International Trade. Even so, this does not relieve the United States of the legal consequences of the discriminatory impact of the decisions of that Court. The United States, like all other Members of the WTO and of the general community of states, bears responsibility for acts of all its departments of government, including its judiciary.

174.The length of the “phase-in” period is not inconsequential for exporting countries desiring certification. That period relates directly to the onerousness of the burdens of complying with the requisites of certification and the practical feasibility of locating and developing alternative export markets for shrimp. The shorter that period, the heavier the burdens of compliance, particularly where an applicant has a large number of trawler vessels, and the greater the difficulties of re-orienting the harvesting country's shrimp exports. The shorter that period, in net effect, the heavier the influence of the import ban. The United States sought to explain the marked difference between “phase-in” periods granted to the fourteen wider Caribbean/western Atlantic countries and those allowed the rest of the shrimp exporting countries. The United States asserted that the longer time-period was justified by the then undeveloped character of TED technology, while the shorter period was later made possible by the improvements in that technology. This explanation is less than persuasive, for it does not address the administrative and financial costs and the difficulties of governments in putting together and enacting the necessary regulatory programs and “credible enforcement effort”, and in implementing the compulsory use of TEDs on hundreds, if not thousands, of shrimp trawl vessels.

175.Differing treatment of different countries desiring certification is also observable in the differences in the levels of effort made by the United States in transferring the required TED technology to specific countries. Far greater efforts to transfer that technology successfully were made to certain exporting countries— basically the fourteen wider Caribbean/western Atlantic countries cited earlier— than to other exporting countries, including the appellees. The level of these efforts is probably related to the length of the “phase-in” periods granted — the longer the “phase-in” period, the higher the possible level of efforts at technology transfer. Because compliance with the requirements of certification realistically assumes successful TED technology transfer, low or merely nominal efforts at achieving that transfer will, in all probability, result in fewer countries being able to satisfy the certification requirements under Section 609, within the very limited “phase-in” periods allowed them.

176.When the foregoing differences in the means of application of Section 609 to various shrimp exporting countries are considered in their cumulative effect, we find, and so hold, that those differences in treatment constitute “unjustifiable discrimination” between exporting countries desiring certification in order to gain access to the United States shrimp market within the meaning of the chapeau of Article ⅩⅩ.

…

185.In reaching these conclusions, we wish to underscore what we have not decided in this appeal. We have not decided that the protection and preservation of the environment is of no significance to the Members of the WTO. Clearly, it is. We have not decided that the sovereign nations that are Members of the WTO cannot adopt effective measures to protect endangered species, such as sea turtles. Clearly, they can and should. And we have not decided that sovereign states should not act together bilaterally, plurilaterally or multilaterally, either within the WTO or in other international fora, to protect endangered species or to otherwise protect the environment. Clearly, they should and do.

186.What we have decided in this appeal is simply this: although the measure of the United States in dispute in this appeal serves an environmental objective that is recognized as legitimate under paragraph （g） of Article ⅩⅩ of the GATT 1994, this measure has been applied by the United States in a manner which constitutes arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination between Members of the WTO, contrary to the requirements of the chapeau of Article ⅩⅩ. For all of the specific reasons outlined in this Report, this measure does not qualify for the exemption that Article ⅩⅩ of the GATT 1994 affords to measures which serve certain recognized, legitimate environmental purposes but which, at the same time, are not applied in a manner that constitutes a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade. As we emphasized in United States - Gasoline, WTO Members are free to adopt their own policies aimed at protecting the environment as long as, in so doing, they fulfill their obligations and respect the rights of other Members under the WTO Agreement.

Findings and Conclusions

187.For the reasons set out in this Report, the Appellate Body:

…

（a）reverses the Panel's finding that accepting non-requested information from non-governmental sources is incompatible with the provisions of the DSU;

（b）reverses the Panel's finding that the United States measure at issue is not within the scope of measures permitted under the chapeau of Article ⅩⅩ of the GATT 1994, and

（c）concludes that the United States measure, while qualifying for provisional justification under Article ⅩⅩ（g）, fails to meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article ⅩⅩ, and, therefore, is not justified under Article ⅩⅩ of the GATT 1994.

Questions:

1.How could controversial measures bejustified when resoting to Article 20 of GATT 1994 according to the DSB jurisprudence?

2.In what kind of conditions can members’ measures be justified in order to protect “Infant Industry”?

【复习思考题】

1.《农产品协定》的主要内容。

2.《纺织品与服装协定》的主要内容。

3.结合WTO争端解决机构所审理的典型案件理解一般例外制度。

[1] 陈卫东：《WTO例外条款解读》，北京，对外经济贸易大学出版社，2002，第197页。

[2] Panel Report on US - Gasoline, paras. 6.26 and 6.28.

[3] Appellate Body Report on EC - Asbestos, paras. 170-172.

[4] 陈卫东：《WTO例外条款解读》，北京，对外经济贸易大学出版社，2002，第242页。

[5] Appellate Body Report on Korea - Various Measures on Beef, para. 157.

[6] Appellate Body Report on Korea - Various Measures on Beef, paras. 161-162 and 164.

[7] Appellate Body Report on US - Shrimp, paras. 128-131.

[8] Appellate Body Report on US - Gasoline, p.19.

[9] Appellate Body Report on US - Gasoline, p. 21.

[10] 曹建明、贺小勇：《世界贸易组织》，北京，法律出版社，2004，第184页。

[11] Appellate Body Report on US - Gasoline, p. 23.

[12] Appellate Body Report on US - Gasoline, p. 25.