世界贸易组织的多边贸易规则，明确承认发展中国家尤其是最不发达国家的特殊利益和要求，在实施期限和义务水平上，都对发展中国家尤其是最不发达国家作出了特殊的安排。
一、特殊差别待遇与普遍优惠待遇的确立
1947年成立初期的GATT的23个缔约方中，有11个发展中国家。但是1947年总协定最初并没有关于发展中国家的特殊规定。1955年关贸总协定作了第一次重要的修订，可看作是特殊和差别待遇的起源。这就是第18条关于发展中国家的特殊规定。GATT第18条题为政府对经济发展的援助，中心思想是发展中国家有更多的自由使用数量限制及其他限制措施保护其幼稚工业和国际收支平衡。具体内容是：
（1）关税再谈判，第18条A节规定，经济上处于发展初期阶段的缔约方（现为WTO成员）为加速某一特定工业建立以提高人民生活水平，可以较为灵活地修改或撤销关税减让表中的某些减让，但需通知缔约方全体（现应为货物贸易理事会）成员，并与有利害关系的其他成员谈判。如达成协议，受损失的成员有权对采取措施的成员实行对等减让。
Section A：7.（a）If a contracting party coming within the scope of paragraph 4 （a） of this Article considers it desirable, in order to promote the establishment of a particular industry* with a view to raising the general standard of living of its people, to modify or withdraw a concession included in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement, it shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES to this effect and enter into negotiations with any contracting party with which such concession was initially negotiated, and with any other contracting party determined by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to have a substantial interest therein. If agreement is reached between such contracting parties concerned, they shall be free to modify or withdraw concessions under the appropriate Schedules to this Agreement in order to give effect to such agreement, including any compensatory adjustments involved.
（b）If agreement is not reached within sixty days after the notification provided for in subparagraph （a） above, the contracting party which proposes to modify or withdraw the concession may refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES which shall promptly examine it. If they find that the contracting party which proposes to modify or withdraw the concession has made every effort to reach an agreement and that the compensatory adjustment offered by it is adequate, that contracting party shall be free to modify or withdraw the concession if, at the same time, it gives effect to the compensatory adjustment. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not find that the compensation offered by a contracting party proposing to modify or withdraw the concession is adequate, but find that it has made every reasonable effort to offer adequate compensation, that contracting party shall be free to proceed with such modification or withdrawal. If such action is taken, any other contracting party referred to in subparagraph （a） above shall be free to modify or withdraw substantially equivalent concessions initially negotiated with the contracting party which has taken the action.
（2）以国际收支为目的实行数量限制，B节规定，经济上处于发展初期阶段的成员为保护对外金融地位和一定的外汇储备，以满足实施经济发展计划的需要，可以采取限制进口商品的数量或价值的方法控制进口的一般水平。这一规定的实施目前应受GATT 1994《关于国际收支平衡条款的谅解》的有关规则调整。
（3）以建立特定工业为目的实施进口限制，C节规定处于经济发展初期阶段的成员如果为提高人民一般生活水平，有必要对某一特定工业提供政府援助，而采取总协定其他规定的措施无法达到这一目的，可以采取暂时背离总协定的任何限制措施，但需按一定程序进行。
由于GATT第18条规定的适用条件有严格限制，程序烦琐，对发展中国家的优惠也不大，历史上很少被援用。
特殊和差别待遇的一个重大发展是1964年关贸总协定的修订，1964年11月，GATT缔约方召开特别大会，决定增补关贸总协定名为“贸易和发展”的第四部分，于1966年正式生效，从此发展中国家可以在GATT体制内享有差别的更优惠待遇。GATT第四部分题为“贸易与发展”，由第36条（原则目的）、第37条（承诺义务）、第38条（联合行动）三部分构成，其中第36条的规定如下。
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
Article ⅩⅩⅩⅥ
Principles and Objectives
1.The contracting parties,
（a）recalling that the basic objectives of this Agreement include the raising of standards of living and the progressive development of the economies of all contracting parties, and considering that the attainment of these objectives is particularly urgent for less-developed contracting parties;
（b）considering that export earnings of the less-developed contracting parties can play a vital part in their economic development and that the extent of this contribution depends on the prices paid by the less-developed contracting parties for essential imports, the volume of their exports, and the prices received for these exports;
（c）noting, that there is a wide gap between standards of living in less-developed countries and in other countries;
（d）recognizing that individual and joint action is essential to further the development of the economies of less-developed contracting parties and to bring about a rapid advance in the standards of living in these countries;
（e）recognizing that international trade as a means of achieving economic and social advancement should be governed by such rules and procedures - and measures in conformity with such rules and procedures - as are consistent with the objectives set forth in this Article;
（f）noting that the CONTRACTING PARTIES may enable less-developed contracting parties to use special measures to promote their trade and development;
agree as follows.
2.There is need for a rapid and sustained expansion of the export earnings of the less-developed contracting parties.
3.There is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that less-developed contracting parties secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.
4.Given the continued dependence of many less-developed contracting parties on the exportation of a limited range of primary products,* there is need to provide in the largest possible measure more favourable and acceptable conditions of access to world markets for these products, and wherever appropriate to devise measures designed to stabilize and improve conditions of world markets in these products, including in particular measures designed to attain stable, equitable and remunerative prices, thus permitting an expansion of world trade and demand and a dynamic and steady growth of the real export earnings of these countries so as to provide them with expanding resources for their economic development.
5.The rapid expansion of the economies of the less-developed contracting parties will be facilitated by a diversification* of the structure of their economies and the avoidance of an excessive dependence on the export of primary products. There is, therefore, need for increased access in the largest possible measure to markets under favourable conditions for processed and manufactured products currently or potentially of particular export interest to less-developed contracting parties.
6.Because of the chronic deficiency in the export proceeds and other foreign exchange earnings of less-developed contracting parties, there are important inter-relationships between trade and financial assistance to development. There is, therefore, need for close and continuing collaboration between the CONTRACTING PARTIES and the international lending agencies so that they can contribute most effectively to alleviating the burdens these less-developed contracting parties assume in the interest of their economic development.
7.There is need for appropriate collaboration between the CONTRACTING PARTIES, other intergovernmental bodies and the organs and agencies of the United Nations system, whose activities relate to the trade and economic development of less-developed countries.
8.The developed contracting parties do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-developed contracting parties.
9.The adoption of measures to give effect to these principles and objectives shall be a matter of conscious and purposeful effort on the part of the contracting parties both individually and jointly.
特殊和差别待遇总的目的是：通过采取缔约方联合行动和发达国家缔约方单独行动，促进发展中国家经济发展，保证发展中国家在国际贸易中占有适当份额，尽可能为发展中国家初级产品、加工品和制成品进入世界市场创造有利条件。为实现此目标要求发达国家承担下述义务。
（1）发达国家对其在贸易谈判中向发展中国家成员承诺减少或撤销关税和其他壁垒的义务，不能希望得到互惠。即不应当期望发展中国家成员在贸易谈判中作出与它们各自发展财政和贸易需要相抵触的贡献（第36条第8款）。
（2）优先降低和消除与发展中国家成员出口利益相关的初级产品和加工品的贸易壁垒。
（3）在调整财政措施时，优先放宽或撤除有可能影响发展中国家初级产品出口的财政措施。
（4）在考虑总协定许可的其他措施解决某项特殊问题时，应特别注意发展中缔约方的贸易利益。如果所采取的措施影响其根本利益，在实施前研究纠正办法（第37条第3款）。
第四部分最重要的影响就是首次承认经济上处于不同发展水平的发达国家和发展中国家的划分，提出发达国家和发展中国家之间的贸易谈判实行某种非互惠（non-reciprocity）的待遇，即发达国家给予发展中国家关税减让时，它们不应期望发展中国家作出同样的减让。为以后发达国家单方面实施普惠制和在贸易谈判中单方面减让关税提供了法律依据。其次，第四部分要求在解决总协定某项特殊问题时，特别注意发展中国家贸易利益和根本利益，这影响到后来对发展中国家差别优惠待遇扩展到多边贸易规则调整的广泛领域；第四部分另一后果是扩大发展中国家初级产品和工业品的市场准入机会；根据第四部分安排还设立了新的常设机构——贸易和发展委员会，负责这一部分的实施，处理涉及发展中国家的贸易关系问题。
1979年东京回合谈判结束时，GATT缔约方通过一项决议，题为《对发展中国家差别和更优惠待遇、互惠和更全面参与的决定》，因为其内容主要是授权发达国家可以背离最惠国待遇原则，给予发展中国家缔约方差别的和更优惠待遇，但是，因为它不是一项强制性义务，该项决议通称“授权条款”，具体内容如下：
（1）授权发达国家缔约方可以背离最惠国待遇原则，给予发展中国家差别和更优惠待遇，而不必将这种待遇给予其他缔约方。
（2）给予发展中国家缔约方差别的更优惠待遇适用于以下领域：①按普惠制给予发展中国家产品优惠关税待遇；②在多边贸易谈判中达成的非关税壁垒协议中规定差别的更优惠待遇；③发展中国家之间缔结的相互给予优惠关税或减免非关税措施的区域性或全球性安排；④对最不发达国家的特殊待遇。
（3）确定普惠制毕业原则，随着发展中国家经济逐步发展和贸易状况改善，他们作出贡献和提供减让的能力也将提高，他们应更充分参与总协定权利和义务体制。
Having regard to the commitment of the participants as set out in Section B （vii） of Part I of the Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration;
1.Decide that, if not already provided for in the instruments negotiated in the course of the Uruguay Round, notwithstanding their acceptance of these instruments, the least-developed countries, and for so long as they remain in that category, while complying with the general rules set out in the aforesaid instruments, will only be required to undertake commitments and concessions to the extent consistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs, or their administrative and institutional capabilities. The least-developed countries shall be given additional time of one year from 15 April 1994 to submit their schedules as required in Article Ⅺ of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
2.Agree that:
（i）Expeditious implementation of all special and differential measures taken in favour of least-developed countries including those taken within the context of the Uruguay Round shall be ensured through, inter alia, regular reviews.
（ii）To the extent possible, MFN concessions on tariff and non-tariff measures agreed in the Uruguay Round on products of export interest to the least-developed countries may be implemented autonomously, in advance and without staging. Consideration shall be given to further improve GSP and other schemes for products of particular export interest to least-developed countries.
（iii）The rules set out in the various agreements and instruments and the transitional provisions in the Uruguay Round should be applied in a flexible and supportive manner for the least-developed countries. To this effect, sympathetic consideration shall be given to specific and motivated concerns raised by the least-developed countries in the appropriate Councils and Committees.
（iv）In the application of import relief measures and other measures referred to in paragraph 3（c） of Article ⅩⅩⅩⅦI of GATT 1947 and the corresponding provision of GATT 1994, special consideration shall be given to the export interests of least-developed countries.
（v）Least-developed countries shall be accorded substantially increased technical assistance in the development, strengthening and diversification of their production and export bases including those of services, as well as in trade promotion, to enable them to maximize the benefits from liberalized access to markets.
3.Agree to keep under review the specific needs of the least-developed countries and to continue to seek the adoption of positive measures which facilitate the expansion of trading opportunities in favour of these countries.
授权条款的主要作用是在第四部分基础上进一步确立了发展中国家在多边贸易体制中应享有的差别的更优惠待遇的法律地位，把这种优惠待遇的范围、实施方式明确化、具体化；授权条款还正式承认此前由联合国贸发会议安排实施的普惠制在GATT体制中的合法地位，使之成为GATT管辖的一项法律制度；依据授权条款，发展中国家享有的差别的更优惠待遇不需经过GATT豁免义务程序，弥补了GATT第四部分的不足。但是GATT第四部分和授权条款的规定主要是授予权利和承认发展中国家的特殊地位，它们并不是有约束力的法律义务，不能强制施行，由此引发的争议也不能通过WTO争端解决机构来解决，因为发达国家给予的优惠是基于“自觉和有目的的努力”，而不是应尽义务。
1979年在东京回合谈判结束时通过“授权条款”，加强广大发展中国家这一特殊地位，使普惠制安排合法化。
1995年1月1日WTO成立，特殊和差别待遇进入一个新的发展阶段，WTO协定中包含了大量对发展中国家特殊和差别待遇的条款。这些条款大多是从GATT1947和其他一些决议、宣言中并入过来的，同时也增加了一些新的内容。
二、特殊、差别待遇
一般而言，特殊和差别待遇（Special and Differential Treatment，S&D）是指在WTO协议中专为授予发展中成员特别权利，或让发达国家对发展中国家提供更好的贸易待遇的条款。在WTO体制内，考虑到发展中国家的特殊情况和需要，赋予了发展中国家在一定的范围和条件下，背离WTO体制的一般义务的权利而享有较优惠的待遇。
GATT1947就在多边贸易体制中引进了特殊和差别待遇条款。经过乌拉圭回合的整合，目前S&D条款遍及WTO各协议中，总计145条之多。在WTO 体系内，WTO大部分协议中都包括了有关特殊和差别待遇条款，其从传统的货物贸易领域，扩展至新兴的服务贸易和与贸易有关的其他领域。另外，对发展中国家和最不发达国家都有相应的规定。根据WTO秘书处的研究报告，WTO协定中对发展中国家特殊和差别待遇的条款大体可以分为6类：（1）旨在增加发展中国家贸易机会的条款。GATT1947中的关于给予发展中国家优惠市场准入待遇的条款在WTO中保留下来，例如GATT第37条要求发达国家尽最大可能保证发展中国家的贸易利益，包括对削减和取消欠发达国家目前或潜在具有特殊出口利益产品的壁垒给予最优先考虑；1979年的授权条款则允许发达国家对来自发展中国家的产品给予普惠制待遇等。根据GATT/WTO的制度安排，这些条款目前仍然有效，构成WTO成员方权利义务的一部分。（2）要求发达国家保护发展中国家利益的条款。协定的一些条款要求发达国家在采用贸易措施时应该考虑到发展中国家的特殊利益，例如《技术贸易壁垒协定》第12条第3款规定，各成员在制定和实施技术法规、标准和一致评定程序时，应考虑到发展中国家成员的特殊发展、金融和贸易需要，以确保这些技术法规、标准和一致评定程序不会对发展中国家成员的出口产生不必要的影响。（3）允许发展中国家在执行多边贸易规则和纪律时采取一定灵活性的条款。例如《农产品协定》中，发展中国家可以削减较少的关税和补贴，可以维持一般性的投资补贴和给予低收入或资源贫乏农民的农业投入补贴;至于农业出口补贴，发展中国家则不被要求在执行协定期间为降低农产品出口的营销费用而提供的补贴以及出口货物的国内运输和运费征收方面作出承诺。（4）给予发展中国家更长的转型期条款。除了《反倾销协定》和《装运前检验协定》外，其他所有的协定都为发展中国家提供了更长的履行期限。（5）技术援助条款。例如《关于实施卫生和植物卫生措施协定》规定，各成员方应以双边形式或通过适当的国际组织向其他成员方尤其是发展中国家成员提供技术帮助。在《海关估价协定》、《装运前检验协定》等协定中也都有类似规定。（6）对最不发达国家的特殊和差别待遇。WTO所有适用于发展中国家的特殊和差别待遇条款都适用于最不发达国家。同时，也有一些专门针对最不发达成员方的一些特殊规定。例如，在《农产品协定》中最不发达国家无需在国内支持、出口补贴和市场准入领域作出削减的承诺；而在《补贴和反补贴协定》中，最不发达国家则被允许使用出口补贴，不受规定期限的限制。
背离最惠国待遇的规定，给发展中国家更优惠待遇，主要通过两种途径进行：第一种是根据关贸总协定第25条和《建立世界贸易组织协定》第9条规定获得义务的豁免。总协定第25条第5款规定：In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this Agreement, the CONTRACTING PARTIES may waive an obligation imposed upon a contracting party by this Agreement; Provided that any such decision shall be approved by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast and that such majority shall comprise more than half of the contracting parties. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may also by such a vote:
（i）define certain categories of exceptional circumstances to which other voting requirements shall apply for the waiver of obligations, and
（ii）prescribe such criteria as may be necessary for the application of this paragraph[1].
历史上，1971年关贸总协定缔约方全体成员即根据此一条款授权发达缔约国在10年内背离最惠国待遇的规定，对发展中国家实行普惠制。WTO将这一豁免严格化，根据《建立世界贸易组织协定》第9条第3款、第4款和《1994年关贸总协定关于豁免义务的谅解》，将2/3多数增加为3/4多数，并且任何超过一年的豁免都需接受部长级会议的年审。另一种途径是通过授权条款获得永久豁免。授权条款第1条规定:“尽管有总协定第1条规定，各缔约方仍可给发展中国家以差别和更优惠待遇，而不将此种待遇给其他缔约方。”
三、普遍优惠待遇
普惠制即普遍优惠制（General System of Preference），是发达国家对于来自发展中国家的某些产品给予的普遍的、非歧视的、非互惠的关税优惠制度。自20世纪60年代以后，随着发展中国家崛起，它们对多边贸易关系中严格的互惠原则和最惠国待遇原则产生异议，认为经济实力悬殊的国家之间实行这些原则使发展中国家负担加重，经济更困难。1964年在日内瓦召开的联合国贸易和发展会议第一届会议上，77国集团发表联合宣言，提出发达国家应给予发展中国家制成品和半制成品出口普遍关税优惠待遇。这次会议虽因发达国家反对这一要求而未能达成协议，却导致关贸总协定增加了关于贸易和发展的第四部分。1968年在新德里召开的联合国第二届贸发会议上以第21（Ⅱ）号决议形式，通过了“给予发展中国家的制成品和半制成品出口以非互惠非歧视的普遍优惠制”原则。1970年贸发会议优惠特别委员会通过一项决定，将普惠制方案具体化。1979年GATT东京回合谈判达成授权条款，使普惠制成为GATT体制中的一项制度。普惠制是WTO体制内对发展中国家“特殊和差别待遇”最重要的表现形式。
普惠制通过发达国家制定的给惠方案来实施，给惠方案中包括受惠国地区，给惠产品、减税幅度、保护措施、原产地规则，等等：（1）给惠国，经合组织和经济互助理事会的所有发达国家都被邀请参加普惠制；（2）受惠国，根据“自选”原则，优惠给予那些自称为发展中国家的国家，给惠国可以某种理由拒绝给某一发展中国家优惠；（3）给惠商品，给惠方案列有给惠产品清单，主要是工业制成品和原料，某些敏感商品除外；（4）减税幅度，普惠制税率是在最惠国待遇基础上的减免，减税幅度是普惠制税率与最惠国税率之间的差额，这意味着只有享受最惠国待遇的国家才享有普惠制；（5）保护措施，给惠国为保护本国经济在普惠制实施中设置保护措施。主要有例外条款：如果从受惠国进口某种产品的数量增加对给惠国工业造成损害，给惠国可以取消优惠；预定限额：给惠国对受惠国产品进口实行限额，包括最高限额和国别配额；普惠制毕业：给惠国如认为受惠国经济发展，产品有了较强竞争力，可以取消优惠。
Case Study
UNITED STATES—MEASURES AFFECTING THE PRODUCTION AND SALE OF CLOVE CIGARETTES
（DISPUTE DS406, 2 September 2011）
Complainant:Indonesia
Respondent:United States
Third Parties: Brazil; Colombia; Dominican Republic; European Union; Guatemala; Mexico; Norway; Turkey
FACTUAL ASPECTS
Introduction
This dispute concerns a tobacco-control measure[2] adopted by the United States that prohibits cigarettes with characterizing flavours, other than tobacco or menthol.
In this section of the Report, the Panel will describe the measure at issue as well as its broader factual context, including the United States’ legal regime for tobacco control, the market for cigarettes in the United States, and the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.
The parties disagree on a number of factual issues. To the extent it is necessary for the Panel to resolve those disputed factual issues, it will do so in its Findings.
The measure at issue
The measure at issue is Section 907（a）（1）（A） of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act （“FFDCA”）, which was added to the FFDCA by Section 101（b） of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act （“FSPTCA”）.[3]
PARTIES’ REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In its Panel Request,Indonesia requests the Panel to find that Section 907（a）（1）（A） is inconsistent with[4]:
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and, alternatively, Article Ⅲ:4 of the GATT 1994[5], because it results in treatment that is less favourable to imported clove cigarettes than that accorded to a like domestic product, menthol cigarettes;
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement because it is more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective;
Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement because the United States did not respond to questions from Indonesia seeking an explanation and justification for the ban submitted during bilateral discussions held 27 August 2009 and through the TBT Committee on 20 August 2009 （G/TBT/W/323）;
Article 2.8 of the TBT Agreement because the ban on cigarettes with characterizing flavours is based on descriptive characteristics;
Article 2.9 of the TBT Agreement because the United States did not comply with the requirements of Articles 2.9.1, 2.9.2, 2.9.3, and 2.9.4 of the TBT Agreement when adopting a technical regulation that has a significant effect on the trade of Indonesia;
Article 2.10 of the TBT Agreement because, in the event the United States believed there was a justification for not following the procedures in Article 2.9 of the TBT Agreement, it did not provide the Secretariat with notification of the measure and the urgent nature of the problem;
Article 2.12 of the TBT Agreement because the United States failed to allow for a reasonable interval of time between the date of publication of the measure and the date that the measure went into effect; and
Article 12.3 of the TBT Agreement because the ban on cigarettes with characterizing flavours created an unnecessary barrier to exports from Indonesia, a developing country.
The United States requests that the Panel reject Indonesia's claims in their entirety.[6]
FINDINGS
Introduction
This dispute concerns Section 907（a）（1）（A）, a tobacco-control measure adopted by the United States for reasons of public health. Cigarettes are inherently harmful to human health, as recognized by the WHO, the scientific community and both parties to this dispute.
At the outset, this Panel would like to emphasize that measures to protect public health are of the utmost importance, and that the WTO Agreements fully recognize and respect the sovereign right of Members to regulate in response to legitimate public health concerns.
We note that the WTO seeks to promote general well-being through trade liberalization and recognizes the right of WTO Members to adopt measures to protect public health.In fact, WTO Members have a large measure of autonomy to determine their own policies to protect human health. This autonomy is only circumscribed by the need to ensure that the means chosen for realizing those policies are consistent with WTO rules. These rules require Members to ensure that those means be non-discriminatory, and otherwise in accordance with the provisions of the WTO Agreements. The sixth preambular recital of the TBT Agreement is explicit in this regard:
“Recognizing that no country should be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the quality of its exports, or for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices, at the levels it considers appropriate, subject to the requirement that they are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade, and are otherwise in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement”.
The importance of public health was also highlighted by WTO Members in the Ministerial Declaration launching the Doha Round, in which Ministers underscored that WTO rules do not prevent Members from taking measures for the protection of human health subject to complying with the WTO Agreements.[7]
Furthermore, we are aware of the important international efforts to curb smoking within the context of the WHO FCTC and its WHO Partial Guidelines.
The task before us is to objectively assess whether Section 907（a）（1）（A） is in conformity with U.S. obligations pursuant to the provisions of the WTO Agreements within our terms of reference. We recall the words of the Appellate Body when it acknowledged that the objective of preserving human life and health “is both vital and important in the highest degree”[8], and that “few interests are more ‘vital’ and ‘important’ than protecting human beings from health risks”.[9]
Analysis by the Panel
Introduction
Indonesia claims that the United States has acted inconsistently with Articles 2.1, 2.2, 2.5, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.12, and 12.3 of the TBT Agreement. We note that, by their own terms, these provisions apply to “technical regulations”.[10]This means that, if Section 907（a）（1）（A） is not a “technical regulation” within the meaning of the TBT Agreement, these provisions would not apply to that measure. Thus, a threshold issue in our examination of Indonesia's claims under the TBT Agreement is whether Section 907（a）（1）（A） is a “technical regulation”.
The legal provision at issue
Article 1.2 of the TBT Agreement provides that “for the purposes of this Agreement the meaning of the terms given in Annex 1 applies”. Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement defines a “technical regulation” as follows:
“Document which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production method.”
We note that the definition of the term “technical regulation” in Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement has already been examined by the Appellate Body: first in EC - Asbestos, and then again in EC - Sardines.[11]In those cases, the Appellate Body set out three criteria that a document must meet to fall within the definition of “technical regulation” in Annex 1.1:
“…First, the document must apply to an identifiable product or group of products. The identifiable product or group of products need not, however, be expressly identified in the document. Second, the document must lay down one or more characteristics of the product. These product characteristics may be intrinsic, or they may be related to the product. They may be prescribed or imposed in either a positive or a negative form. Third, compliance with the product characteristics must be mandatory. As we stressed in EC - Asbestos, these three criteria are derived from the wording of the definition in Annex 1.1. …”[12]
The Panel will therefore proceed to analyse whether Section 907（a）（1）（A） constitutes a “technical regulation” within the meaning of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement by examining these three criteria.
Elements of the definition of a technical regulation
First element: Whether Section 907（a）（1）（A） applies to an “identifiable product or group of products”
Second element: Whether Section 907（a）（1）（A） lays down one or more “product characteristics”
Third element: Whether compliance with the product characteristics is mandatory
Conclusion
The Panel finds that Section 907（a）（1）（A） is a “technical regulation” within the meaning of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement. The Panel will now turn to examine Indonesia's claims under Articles 2.1, 2.2, 2.5, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.12, and 12.3 of the TBT Agreement.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As described in greater detail above, the Panel finds that:
Section 907（a）（1）（A） is a “technical regulation” within the meaning of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement;
Section 907（a）（1）（A） is inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement because it accords to imported clove cigarettes treatment less favourable than that it accords to like menthol cigarettes of national origin;
by failing to demonstrate that the ban on clove cigarettes imposed by Section 907（a）（1）（A） is more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil the legitimate objective of reducing youth smoking, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create, Indonesia has failed to demonstrate that Section 907（a）（1）（A） is inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement;
by failing to request the United States to explain the justification for Section 907（a）（1）（A） “in terms of Articles 2.2 to 2.4 of the TBT Agreement” through its questions in document G/TBT/W/323, Indonesia has failed to demonstrate that the United States acted inconsistently with Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement;
by failing to demonstrate that it would be “appropriate” to formulate the technical regulation in Section 907（a）（1）（A） in terms of “performance”,Indonesia has failed to demonstrate that Section 907（a）（1）（A） is inconsistent with Article 2.8 of the TBT Agreement;
by failing to notify to WTO Members through the Secretariat the products to be covered by the proposed Section 907（a）（1）（A）, together with a brief indication of its objective and rationale, at an early appropriate stage, i.e., when amendments and comments were still possible, the United States has acted inconsistently with Article 2.9.2 of the TBT Agreement;
by failing to demonstrate that it had requested the United States to provide particulars or copies of Section 907（a）（1）（A） while it was still in draft form, Indonesia has failed to demonstrate that the United States acted inconsistently with Article 2.9.3 of the TBT Agreement;
by not allowing an interval of no less than six months between the publication and the entry into force of Section 907（a）（1）（A）, the United States has acted inconsistently with Article 2.12 of the TBT Agreement;
by failing to demonstrate that the United States did not take account of the special development, financial and trade needs of Indonesia, in the preparation and application of Section 907（a）（1）（A）, Indonesia has failed to demonstrate that the United States acted inconsistently with Article 12.3 of the TBT Agreement.
In the absence of any evidence or argument on the existence of urgent problems of health that arose or threatened to arise for the United States at the time of adopting Section 907（a）（1）（A）, the Panel declines to rule on Indonesia's claim under Article 2.10 of the TBT Agreement.
Having found that Section 907（a）（1）（A） is inconsistent with Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, the Panel also declines to rule on Indonesia's claim under Article Ⅲ:4 of the GATT 1994.
Having declined to rule on Indonesia's alternative claim under Article Ⅲ:4 of the GATT 1994, the Panel further declines to rule on whether Section 907（a）（1）（A） is justified under Article ⅩⅩ（b） of the GATT 1994.
Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment of benefits under that agreement. Accordingly, we conclude that the United States has nullified or impaired benefits accruing to Indonesia under the TBT Agreement, to the extent that the United States has acted inconsistently with Articles 2.1, 2.9.2 and 2.12 of the TBT Agreement.
Pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, having found that the United States has acted inconsistently with its obligations under Articles 2.1,2.9.2 and 2.12 of the TBT Agreement, we recommend that the Dispute Settlement Body request the United States to bring Section 907（a）（1）（A） into conformity with its obligations under the TBT Agreement.
Questions:
1.Why is Section 907（a）（1）（A） of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act （“FFDCA”） inconsistent with its obligations under Articles 2.1, 2.9.2 and 2.12 of the TBT Agreement？
2.How does the Panel examine that Section 907（a）（1）（A） constitutes a “technical regulation” within the meaning of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement?
【复习思考题】
1.WTO最惠国待遇原则的适用有哪些例外？
2.WTO国民待遇原则的适用有哪些例外？
3.最惠国待遇原则与国民待遇原则在适用中的区别。
[1] The authentic text erroneously reads “sub-paragraph”.
[2] Article 1（d） of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control （see Section below） defines “tobacco control” to mean “a range of supply, demand and harm reduction strategies that aim to improve the health of a population by eliminating or reducing their consumption of tobacco products and exposure to tobacco smoke”.
[3] In response to Panel question No. 9, the parties have clarified that the measure at issue is properly referred to as “Section 907（a）（1）（A） of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act （as amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act）” or, as shorthand, “Section 907（a）（1）（A） of the FFDCA”. It can also be referred to as “21 U.S.C. § 387g（a）（1）（A）” （which is section 387g（a）（1）（A） of title 21 of the U.S. Code）.
[4] In its Panel Request, Indonesia presented claims under Article ⅩⅩ of the GATT 1994 and Articles 2, 3, 5 and 7 of the SPS Agreement. However, in response to Panel question Nos. 1 and 20, Indonesia clarified that it was not claiming a violation of Article ⅩⅩ of the GATT 1994 and that the measure at issue is not an SPS measure and is thus not subject to the SPS Agreement.
[5] In its Panel Request, Indonesia presented the claim under Article Ⅲ:4 of the GATT 1994 as a main claim. However, in paragraph 69 of its first written submission and in response to Panel question No. 25, Indonesia clarified that its claim under Article Ⅲ:4 of the GATT 1994 is as an alternative to its national treatment claim under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
[6] United States’ first written submission, para. 344.
[7] Doha Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN（01）/DEC/1, para. 6.
[8] Appellate Body Report, EC - Asbestos, para. 172.
[9] Appellate Body Report, Brazil - Retreaded Tyres, para. 144 （footnotes omitted）.
[10] Article 12.3 of the TBT Agreement applies not only to “technical regulations”, but also to “standards and conformity assessment procedures”. However, Indonesia does not allege that the measure at issue in this dispute is either a “standard” or a “conformity assessment procedure”.
[11] Appellate Body Report, EC - Asbestos, paras. 59-77; Appellate Body Report, EC - Sardines, paras. 171-195. See also Panel Report, EC - Trademarks and Geographical Indications （Australia）, paras. 7.4267.459; Panel Report, EC - Trademarks and Geographical Indications （US）, paras. 492-515.
[12] Appellate Body Report, EC - Sardines, para. 176 （emphasis original, footnote omitted）, citing Appellate Body Report, EC - Asbestos, paras. 66-70.