Foreign law firms can provide legal services only in the form of representative offices in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Haikou, Dalian, Qingdao, Ningbo, Yantai, Tianjin, Suzhou, Xiamen, Zhuhai,Hangzhou, Fuzhou, Wuhan, Chengdu, Shenyang and Kunming only.
Representative offices can engage in profit-making activities. Representative offices in China shall be no less than the number established upon the date of accession. A foreign law firm can only establish one representative office in China. The above-mentioned geographic and quantitative limitations will be eliminated within one year after China's accession to the WTO. Business scope of foreign representative offices is only as follows:
（a） to provide clients with consultancy on the legislation of the country/region where the lawyers of the law firm are permitted to engage in lawyer's professional work, and on international conventions and practices;
（b） to handle, when entrusted by clients or Chinese law firms, legal affairs of the country/region where the lawyers of the law firm are permitted to engage in lawyer's professional work;
（c） to entrust, on behalf of foreign clients, Chinese law firms to deal with the Chinese legal affairs;
（d） to enter into contracts to maintain long-term entrustment relations with Chinese law firms for legal affairs;
（e） to provide information on the impact of the Chinese legal environment. Entrustment allows the foreign representative office to directly instruct lawyers in the entrusted Chinese law firm, as agreed between both parties.
The representatives of a foreign law firm shall be practitioner lawyers who are members of the bar or law society in a WTO member and have practiced for no less than two years outside of China. The Chief representative shall be a partner or equivalent （e.g., member of a law firm of a limited liability corporation） of a law firm of a WTO member and have practiced for no less than three years.
（4）Presence of natural persons
Unbound except as indicated in Horizontal Commitments.
Limitation on national treatment
（1） Cross-border supply：None
（2） Consumption abroad：None
（3） Commercial presence
All representatives shall be resident in China no less than six months each year. The representative office shall not employ Chinese national registered lawyers outside of China.
（4）Presence of natural persons
Unbound except as indicated in Horizontal Commitments.[11]
（八）保护知识产权
为与WTO的TRIPS协定接轨，中国已经将知识产权保护作为改革开放政策和社会主义法制建设的重要组成部分。在加入WTO前，中国知识产权保护体制建设就已达到世界水平。中国于1980年成为世界知识产权组织成员。1985年，中国成为《保护工业产权巴黎公约》成员方。中国是最早签署《关于集成电路的知识产权条约》的国家之一。1989年，中国成为《商标国际注册马德里协定》成员方。1992年，中国成为《保护文学艺术作品伯尔尼公约》成员方。1993年，中国成为《保护音像制作者防止非法复制公约》成员方。1994年，中国成为《国际专利合作条约》成员方和《商标注册用货物和服务国际分类尼斯协定》成员方。1995年，中国成为《为专利程序目的进行微生物存放的国际承认的布达佩斯条约》成员方，并申请成为《商标国际注册马德里协定议定书》成员方。1996年，中国成为《建立工业设计国际分类洛迦诺协定》成员方。1997年，中国成为《国际专利分类斯特拉斯堡协定》成员方。
在国内法方面，为遵守TRIPS协定，中国已对《专利法》、《著作权法》、《商标法》以及涵盖TRIPS协定不同领域的有关实施细则进行了修改，中国的国内立法已经基本符合TRIPS协定的要求。
目前，中国知识产权保护方面的问题主要在执行方面。尽管中国在加入WTO后的几年内在打击盗版等知识产权执法方面作出重大努力，但由于国民意识等方面的原因，要实现TRIPS协定所要达到的目标，中国还有很长的路要走。
三、“一国四席”问题
1986年4月23日和1991年1月11日香港和澳门分别成为关税总协定缔约方，根据《WTO协定》第11条第1款的规定，这两个单独关税区于1995年1月1日分别成为WTO创始成员。2001年12月11日和2002年1月1日，中国与“台湾、澎湖、金门、马祖单独关税区”也先后成为WTO的正式成员。由此，中国、中国台北[12]、中国香港[13]和中国澳门[14]构成了WTO体制中独特的“一国四席”现象。
（一）“一国四席”的法律依据
《WTO协定》第12条第1款规定了成员加入的资格和程序：“任何国家或在处理其对外商业关系及本协定和多边贸易协定规定的其他事务中享有充分自治权的单独关税区，可按它与WTO议定的条件加入本协定。此加入适用于本协定及所附多边贸易协定。”
Article Ⅻ Accession
Any State or separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters provided for in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements may accede to this Agreement, on terms to be agreed between it and the WTO. Such accession shall apply to this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto.
由于WTO的主要成员方仍为国家，因此在WTO协定各多边贸易协定中对于成员方概念通常使用“国家”（country / countries or State）。为避免引起歧义，《WTO协定》在“解释性说明”中指出：“本协定和多边贸易协定中使用的‘国家’应理解为包括任何WTO单独关税区成员。对于WTO单独关税区成员，除非另有规定，如本协定和多边贸易协定中用‘国民’一词表述，该表述应理解为与该单独关税区有关。”
Explanatory Notes
The terms “country” or “countries” as used in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements are to be understood to include any separate customs territory Member of the WTO.
In the case of a separate customs territory Member of the WTO, where an expression in this Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements is qualified by the term “national”, such expression shall be read as pertaining to that customs territory, unless otherwise specified.
作为主权国家，中国加入WTO的资格是国际法赋予国家的无可争议的基本权利。
香港加入WTO的资格主要基于1984年《中英联合声明》第3（6）、3（10）条和附件1第6节的规定，即“香港特别行政区将保持自由港和独立关税地区的地位”；“可以‘中国香港’的名义单独地同各国、各地区及有关国际组织保持和发展经济、文化关系，并签订有关协议”；“可参加关税和贸易总协定”。1990年《香港特别行政区基本法》第116、151、152条进一步重申和明确了上述规定。
同样，澳门加入WTO的资格基于1987年4月13日签订的《中葡关于澳门问题的联合声明》第2（7）条和附件1第10节的规定，“澳门特别行政区可以‘中国澳门’的名义单独同各国、各地区及有关国际组织保持和发展经济、文化关系，并签订有关协定”；“作为自由港和单独关税地区”，“继续参加关税和贸易总协定”。1993年《澳门特别行政区基本法》第112、136～138条对此进一步予以重申。
我国台湾地区申请加入GATT的法律根据存在争议。台湾地区根据GATT1947第33条申请加入GATT。该条规定：“不属本协定缔约方的政府，或代表在处理其对外商务关系和本协定规定的其他事项方面拥有充分自治权的单独关税区的政府，可代表该政府本身或代表该关税区，按该政府与缔约方全体议定的条件加入本协定。”从GATT的立法背景看，上述“代表……单独关税区的政府”一般指代表单独关税区的原宗主国政府。因此，有学者认为，台湾根据总协定第33条提出以“单独关税领土”申请加入总协定，在国际法上是非法之举。[15]也有学者从GATT工作组受理台湾的申请并进行有关审议工作这一事实出发，认为“代表……单独关税区的政府”从文义上看，除代表单独关税区的原宗主国政府外，也可以指代表单独关税区的本级政府本身。无论如何，台湾地区并未加入GATT。台湾地区申请加入WTO的依据是《WTO协定》第12条。由于《WTO协定》第12条的“国家”与“单独关税区”是并列的概念，因而解决了GATT第33条“单独关税区”在加入WTO时的“代表”问题，因此，我国台湾地区是以单独关税区的身份加入了WTO。
（二）“一国四席”下成员之间的关系
1.WTO体制内的贸易关系
《WTO协定》的“解释性说明”指出，“国家”应理解为包括任何 WTO单独关税区成员。根据这一规定，中国、中国台北、中国香港、中国澳门在WTO多边贸易体制内是独立平等的成员关系，四方主体之间不存在隶属与领导关系，各方均有权自主参与WTO有关会议，独立作出决策，并以自身的名义享有权利并承担义务。具体来说，各方在WTO体制内的关系包含以下四个方面：（1）平等、独立的代表权，即中国和中国香港、中国澳门、中国台北的代表分别参加部长级会议、总理事会、分理事会和各委员会；（2）平等、独立的参与权和决策权，即各方在WTO规则的制定、修改和多边贸易谈判方面享有平等、独立的参与权和决策权；（3）独立的申诉权和责任承担制度，即在争端解决方面，各方拥有独立的申诉权，并实施独立的责任承担制度。对于中国与中国香港、中国澳门或中国台北之间有关多边贸易协定的争端，也属 WTO不同成员之间的争端，可通过 WTO争端解决程序解决。[16]
2.WTO体制外的贸易关系
（1）内地与香港、澳门的“更紧密经贸关系的安排”。
GATT与WTO多边贸易体制允许成员方之间建立关税同盟和自由贸易区。根据GATT第24条第4、5款规定，GATT的规定不得阻止在缔约方领土之间形成关税同盟或自由贸易区，也不得阻止通过形成关税同盟或自由贸易区所必需的临时协定。关税同盟、自由贸易区和导向关税同盟或自由贸易区的临时协定是区域经济一体化安排的不同层次和类型。其中，关税同盟是区域经济一体化的最高层次，其次是自由贸易区，临时协定是区域经济一体化的初级阶段。WTO的《服务贸易总协定》第5条也有类似规定。
2003年6月29日，中国中央政府和香港特别行政区政府签署了《内地与香港关于建立更紧密经贸关系的安排》（Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement，CEPA）。2003年9月29日，双方又签订了《关于货物贸易零关税的实施》、《关于货物贸易的原产地规则》、《关于原产地证书的签发和核查程序》、《关于开放服务贸易领域的具体承诺》、《关于“服务提供者”定义及相关规定》和《关于贸易投资便利化》6个附件。2003年10月17日，中央政府和澳门特别行政区政府也签署了《内地与澳门关于建立更紧密经贸关系的安排》及6个附件。
从内容上，CEPA共分为六章，分别为总则、货物贸易、原产地[17]、服务贸易、贸易投资便利化、其他条款。其内容主要包括三个方面：货物贸易、服务贸易和贸易投资便利化。①关于货物贸易的规定，内容主要涉及零关税、关税配额和非关税措施、反倾销措施、补贴与反补贴措施、保障措施、原产地规则等方面；②关于服务贸易的规定，内容涉及服务业的市场准入条件、金融合作、旅游合作、专业人员资格的相互承认三方面；③贸易投资便利化方面，内容涉及贸易投资促进；通关便利化；商品检验检疫、食品安全、质量标准；电子商务；法律、法规透明度；中小企业合作；中医药产业合作七方面。
从性质上说，CEPA是一国领土范围内的区域经济一体化安排，其不同于主权国家之间签订的“自由贸易协定”（Free Trade Agreement，FTA），然而，CEPA的成立基础主要是GATT和WTO相关规定，因而其又不属于国内法。但从内容和适用上来看，CEPA更接近于自由贸易协定，因此，CEPA是WTO框架下一种具有自由贸易协定性质的国内区域经济一体化安排。
（2）大陆与台湾地区的“两岸共同市场”。
“两岸共同市场”理念是台湾原“地区领导人”萧万长在2000年底最先提出。2005年4月26日至5月3日，中国国民党主席连战访问大陆，在《中国共产党总书记胡锦涛与中国国民党主席连战会谈新闻公报》中，明确提出了促进两岸恢复协商后“优先讨论两岸共同市场问题”。其后在2005年5月5日至5月13日，亲民党主席宋楚瑜访问大陆，在《中国共产党总书记胡锦涛与亲民党主席宋楚瑜会谈公报》中又提出“就建立两岸贸易便利和自由化（两岸自由贸易区）等长期、稳定的相关机制问题进行磋商”。这是大陆首次对“两岸共同市场”问题的正面回应。
与CEPA相同，“两岸共同市场”提出的目的是在WTO多边贸易体制之外进一步加强两岸经济合作。在具体做法上，两岸共同市场是一个目标，也是一个过程，可以分三阶段循序渐进地推动：第一阶段应先三通直航，推动两岸经贸关系正常化，两岸应尽快建立定期、官方性质的协商机制；第二阶段则推动两岸经济制度调和，进一步推动经济法规制度的调和及各种标准化的事宜，减少双方经济体制的差异性，并商签类似FTA和CEPA的协定；第三阶段则是全方位的经济统合工作，包括关税同盟、货币同盟等，以实现“两岸共同市场”的目标。
自萧万长提出的“两岸共同市场”理念在新闻公报中得到响应之后，越来越多的大陆学者开始研究和探讨建立“两岸共同市场”的具体理论和实践问题。台湾地区以及大陆的部分学者都在WTO框架下探讨过两岸经贸合作机制，但是两者的出发点和立足点有所不同。大陆学者是从WTO的原则以及台湾地区和大陆在WTO中“中国主体同单独关税区之间的经贸关系”的角度出发，立足点是“一个中国，四个席位”；而一些台湾学者在讨论WTO框架下两岸经贸合作机制的建设时更多的是从WTO成员的角度出发，立足点是“WTO成员之间的对等形式”。
目前，“两岸共同市场”建立的条件尚不成熟，但在CEPA成功促进内地与香港、澳门的经济一体化后，大陆与台湾地区的经贸合作也是大势所趋，至于具体采取何种方式则非问题之关键。
Case Study
CERTAIN FROZEN OR CANNED WARMW ATER SHRIMP AND PRAWNS
FROM BRAZIL, CHINA, ECUADOR, INDIA, THAILAND, AND VIETNAM
In December 2003, the Southern Shrimp Alliance （composed of shrimp industry groups from Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Texas, and South Carolina） filed antidumping petitions with the Department of Commerce （DOC） and the U.S. International Trade Commission （ITC） alleging that imports of certain frozen and canned warm water shrimp from Brazil, China, Ecuador, India, Thailand, and Vietnam were being sold at less than fair value and were materially injuring the domestic shrimp industry. Following an affirmative determination of dumping by the DOC （with antidumping margins ranging from 1.97 percent to 82.27 percent）, the ITC determined in January 2005, that the U.S. shrimp industry was materially injured by imports of non-canned shrimp and prawns from the countries listed （imports of canned warm-water shrimp and prawns were found to be negligible, thus canned products were dropped from the investigations）.
Below are some preliminary determinations of China [18]
…
Non Market Economy Country
For purposes of initiation, the Petitioners submitted LTFV（less than fair value） analyses for the PRC as a non-market economy（NME）. In accordance with section 771（18）（c）（i） of the Tariff Act of 1930（hereafter “the Act”）any determination that a foreign country is an NME country shall remain in effect until revoked by the administering authority. When the Department is investigating imports from an NME, section 773（c）（1） of the Act directs us to base the normal value on the NME producer's factors of production, valued in an economically comparable market economy that is a significant producer of comparable merchandise.
Surrogate Country
When the Department is investigating imports from an NME country, section 773（c）（1） of the Act directs it to base normal value （“NV”）, in most circumstances, on the NME producer's factors of production, valued in a surrogate market-economy country or countries considered to be appropriate by the Department. In accordance with section 773（c）（4） of the Act, in valuing the factors of production, the Department shall utilize, to the extent possible, the prices or costs of factors of production in one or more market-economy countries that are at a level of economic development comparable to that of the NME country and are significant producers of comparable merchandise. The sources of the surrogate values we have used in this investigation are discussed under the NV section below. The Department determined that India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Phillippines, Ecuador and Egypt are countries comparable to the PRC in terms of economic development. We select an appropriate surrogate country based on the availability and reliability of data from the countries. In this case, we have found that India is a significant producer of comparable merchandise, frozen and canned warm water shrimp, and is at a similar level of economic development pursuant to 733（c）（4） of the Act. Since our issuance of the Surrogate Country Memo, we have not received comments from interested parties regarding this issue.
Separate Rates
In proceedings involving NME countries, the Department has a rebuttable presumption that all companies within the country are subject to government control and thus should be assessed a single antidumping duty rate. It is the Department's policy to assign all exporters of merchandise subject to investigation in an NME country this single rate unless an exporter can demonstrate that it is sufficiently independent so as to be entitled to a separate rate. The four mandatory respondents and the Section A respondents have provided company-specific information and each has stated that it met the standards for the assignment of a separate rate. We have considered whether each PRC company is eligible for a separate rate. The Department's separate-rate test is not concerned, in general, with macroeconomic /border-type controls, e.g., export licenses, quotas, and minimum export prices, particularly if these controls are imposed to prevent dumping. The test focuses, rather, on controls over the investment, pricing, and output decision-making process at the individual firm level. To establish whether a firm is sufficiently independent from government control of its export activities to be entitled to a separate rate, the Department analyzes each entity exporting the subject merchandise under a test arising from the Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value. In accordance with the separate-rates criteria, the Department assigns separate rates in NME cases only if respondents can demonstrate the absence of both de jure and de facto governmental control over export activities.
1. Absence of De Jure Control
The Department considers the following de jure criteria in determining whether an individual company may be granted a separate rate: （1） An absence of restrictive stipulations associated with an individual exporter's business and export licenses; （2） any legislative enactments decentralizing control of companies; and （3） other formal measures by the government decentralizing control of companies.
Our analysis shows that the evidence on the record supports a preliminary finding of de jure absence of governmental control based on the following: （1） An absence of restrictive stipulations associated with the individual exporter's business and export licenses; （2） the applicable legislative enactments decentralizing control of the companies; and （3） any other formal measures by the government decentralizing control of companies.
2. Absence of De Facto Control
Typically the Department considers four factors in evaluating whether each respondent is subject to de facto governmental control of its export functions: （1） Whether the export prices are set by or are subject to the approval of a governmental agency; （2） whether the respondent has authority to negotiate and sign contracts and other agreements; （3） whether the respondent has autonomy from the government in making decisions regarding the selection of management; and （4） whether the respondent retains the proceeds of its export sales and makes independent decisions regarding disposition of profits or financing of losses. The Department has determined that an analysis of de facto control is critical in determining whether respondents are, in fact, subject to a degree of governmental control which would preclude the Department from assigning separate rates.
We determine that, for the mandatory respondents and certain Section A respondents,the evidence on the record supports a preliminary finding of de facto absence of governmental control based on record statements and supporting documentation showing the following: （1） Each exporter sets its own export prices independent of the government and without the approval of a government authority; （2） each exporter retains the proceeds from its sales and makes independent decisions regarding disposition of profits or financing of losses; （3） each exporter has the authority to negotiate and sign contracts and other agreements; and （4） each exporter has autonomy from the government regarding the selection of management. Therefore, the evidence placed on the record of this investigation by the mandatory respondents and certain Section A respondents[19] demonstrates an absence of government control, both in law and in fact, with respect to each of the exporter's exports of the merchandise under investigation, in accordance with the criteria identified in Sparklers and Silicon Carbide[20]. As a result, for the purposes of this preliminary determination, we have granted separate, company-specific rates to the mandatory respondents and certain Section A respondents which shipped certain frozen and canned warmwater shrimp to the United States during the POI（The period of investigation）.
PRC-Wide Rate
The Department has data that indicates there are more known exporters of the certain frozen and canned warmwater shrimp from the PRC during the POI that responded to our quantity and value （“Q&V”） questionnaire. Although we issued the Q&V questionnaire to nine known Chinese exporters of subject merchandise （as identified in the petition）, we received 57 Q&V questionnaire responses, including those from the four mandatory respondents. Also, on January 29, 2004, we issued a Section A questionnaire to the Government of the PRC （i.e., Ministry of Commerce）. Although all known exporters were given an opportunity to provide information showing they qualify for separate rates, not all of these other exporters provided a response to either the Department's Q&V questionnaire or its Section A questionnaire. Further, the Government of the PRC did not respond to the Department's questionnaire.}Therefore, the Department determines preliminarily that there were exports of the merchandise under investigation from other PRC producers/exporters, which are treated as part of the countrywide entity. Section 776（a）（2） of the Act provides that, if an interested party: （A） withholds information that has been requested by the Department; （B） fails to provide such information in a timely manner or in the form or manner requested, subject to subsections 782（c）（1） and （e） of the Act; （C） significantly impedes a determination under the antidumping statute; or （D） provides such information but the information cannot be verified, the Department shall, subject to subsection 782（d） of the Act, use facts otherwise available in reaching the applicable determination.
Pursuant to section 782（e） of the Act, the Department shall not decline to consider submitted information if all of the following requirements are met: （1） The information is submitted by the established deadline; （2） the information can be verified; （3） the information is not so incomplete that it cannot serve as a reliable basis for reaching the applicable determination; （4） the interested party has demonstrated that it acted to the best of its ability; and （5） the information can be used without undue difficulties.
Information on the record of this investigation indicates that there are numerous producers/exporters of the certain frozen and canned warmwater shrimp in the PRC. As described above, all exporters were given the opportunity to respond to the Department's questionnaire. Based upon our knowledge of the volume of imports of subject merchandise from the PRC and the fact that information indicates that the responding companies did not account for all imports into the United States from the PRC, we have preliminary determined that certain PRC exporters of certain frozen and canned warmwater shrimp failed to respond to our questionnaires. As a result, use of adverse facts available （“AFA”） pursuant to section 776（a）（2）（A） of the Act is appropriate. Additionally, in this case, the Government of the PRC did not respond to the Department's questionnaire, thereby necessitating the use of AFA to determine the PRC-wide rate.
Section 776（b） of the Act provides that, in selecting from among the facts available, the Department may employ adverse inferences if an interested party fails to cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability to comply with requests for information. We find that, because the PRC-wide entity and certain producers/ exporters did not respond at all to our request for information, they have failed to cooperate to the best of their ability. Therefore, the Department preliminarily finds that, in selecting from among the facts available, an adverse inference is appropriate.
In accordance with our standard practice, as AFA, we have assigned the PRC-wide entity the higher of the highest margin stated in the notice of initiation （i.e., the recalculated petition margin） or the highest margin calculated for any respondent in this investigation. In this case, we have applied a rate of 112.81 percent, the highest rate calculated in the Initiation Notice of the investigation from information provided in the petition.
Questions:
1. What did the PRC exporters do with the requests for information? How should they do with in the anti-dumping procedures?
2. What's your opinion about the Non-Market-Economy status of china in the “Accession of The People's Republic of China”?
【复习思考题】
1.辨析：特保措施与纺织品特殊保障措施。
2.如何看待中国加入世界贸易组织所作出的主要承诺？
3.结合第一章的内容谈谈中国在WTO新一轮谈判中所享有的组织法和实体法权利。
4.针对中国入世议定书中的非市场经济规定，中国政府与企业应该寻求哪些解决办法?
5.如何处理中国内地、香港、澳门和台湾地区的经贸关系与经贸争议？
6.目前中国与WTO成员方在哪些领域存在较大争议，如何处理？
[1] 详见http://www.WTO.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm，2012年2月17日访问。
[2] Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, Article 3.
[3] Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, Article 2（C）.
[4] 曾令良：《中国加入WTO及其司法审查制度的完善》，载《武汉大学学报》（社会科学版），2001（3）。
[5] Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, Article 2 （D）.
[6] 曾令良：《中国特定产品过渡性保障机制的有效性与合理性问题》，载《法学评论》，2005（5）。
[7] \[美\]布鲁斯·E·克拉伯:《美国对外贸易法和海关法》（上），蒋兆康等译，北京，法律出版社，2000，第758～759页。转引自曾令良:《中国特定产品过渡性保障机制的有效性与合理性问题》，载《法学评论》，2005（5）。
[8] Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, Article 16.
[9] Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, Article 15.
[10] 张桂红：《WTO对中国法律的影响》，载《中国法学》，2001（4）。
[11] Schedule CLⅡ-The People's Republic of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49/Add.2, 1 October 2001.
[12] “中国台北”是“台湾、澎湖、金门、马祖单独关税区”的简称。
[13] 1997年7月1日中国对香港恢复行使主权后，香港在WTO中更名为“中国香港”。
[14] 1999年12月20日中国对澳门恢复行使主权后，澳门在WTO中更名为“中国澳门”。
[15] 曾令良：《世界贸易组织法》，武汉，武汉大学出版社，1996，第68～71页。
[16] 曾华群：《略论WTO体制的“一国四席”》，载《厦门大学学报》（哲学社会科学版），2002 （5）。
[17] 由于香港是自由港，对来自其他国家和地区的产品和服务既没有关税和非关税限制，也没有反补贴、反倾销、保障措施等贸易救济措施。在这种情况下，如果不能有效识别原产于香港或澳门的产品，就会使来自其他成员的货物和服务通过香港直达内地，损害相关产业的利益。因此，原产地规则是CEPA的一个重点规范内容。
[18] Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 136 / Friday, July 16, 2004/Notices, pp.42660-42662. available at: http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/investigations/2004/shrimp/prelimphase.htm.
[19] For a full discussion of this issue and list of Section A respondents, please see the Separate-Rates Memo. Section A Respondents: on February 23, 2003, the Department selected its mandatory respondents. On February 25, 2004, the Department sent Section A questionnaires to the Respondents. On March 8, 2004, the Department received a request from companies who wished to submit voluntary Section A questionnaires responses （hereafter known as Section A Respondents）.
[20] Sparklers from the People's Republic of China, 56 FR 20588 （May 6, 1991） （“Sparklers”）;Silicon Carbide from the People's Republic of China, 59 FR 22585 （May 2,1994） （“Silicon Carbide”）.